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Abstract
This Note analyzes the United Nations’ use of sanctions in Haiti to draw lessons for the future
use of sanctions and argues that there is an inherent tension in the Charter between measures
called for under Article 41 and the United Nations’ obligations under Article 55. Part I of this
Note presents the background and the legal bases for U.N. sanctions. Part I also discusses the
adoption of measures to solve Haiti’s crisis outside of and within the Chapter VII framework of
the U.N. Charter. Part II examines the debate surrounding the use of sanctions to solve Haiti’s
crisis. Part III argues that the U.N. imposed sanctions undermined the organization’s mandate
to promote Haiti’s economic and social development pursuant to Article 55 of the Charter. Part
III also suggests that due to the lack of enforcement alternatives available to the United Nations
to maintain international peace and security, the United Nations needs to improve its procedural
mechanisms for the implementation and monitoring of sanctions. This Note concludes that, while
sanctions are viable policy tools, the United Nations must apply the sanctions within the limits set
out in Article 55 of the U.N. Charter.
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In recent years, the Security Council has called, with increas-
ing frequency, for economic sanctions as an enforcement tool
under Chapter VII. The universal character of the United
Nations makes it a particularly appropriate body to consider
and oversee such measures. Consideration needs to be given,
however, to making these sanctions more effective in achiev-
ing the goal of modifying the behaviour of those targeted,
while limiting the collateral damages. There is also a need to
address the broader humanitarian and economic effects of
sanctions, as well as objective criteria in their application and
for their termination.1
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations' imposition of sanctions on Haiti in
June 19932 and May 1994,s represented a culmination of years of
foreign policy calculations on the part of the United Nations, the
United States, and the international donor community at large.4
Sanctions also constituted another attempt to rectify Haiti's lat-
est crisis, the overthrow of the country's first democratically-
elected president by the Haitian military.5 The coup d'6tat re-
flected nearly two hundred years of domestic social, political,
and economic warfare.6 Sanctions were the only tools available
1. Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, Report of the Secretary General,
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 168, at 36, U.N. Doc. A/51/950 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Renewing the United Nations].
2. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 3238th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (1993).
3. S.C. Res. 917, U.N. SCOR, 3376th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/917 (1994).
4. See UNITED NATIONS, LEs NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI 1990-1995, at 3-6, 10-37, U.N.
Sales No. F.96.I.11 (1996) (outlining actions undertaken by United Nations, United
States, and international donor community) [hereinafter LEs NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI].
5. See id. at 19-20 (discussing coup d'ltat that took place on September 29-30, 1991).
General Raoul C~dras and Commander Michel FranCois led the overthrow of Aristide.
Id. at 20.
6. Sidney W. Mintz, Can Haiti Change?, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 1, at 73, 73 (1995). Haiti's
national and international crises have been in the making since the country's founda-
tion as an independent sovereign state in 1804. Id. Four groups of actors heavily im-
pacted the course of Haiti's development as a nation-state: the army, the french-speak-
ing elite, the Catholic Church and Voodoo, and the Kreyol-speaking poor. PATRICK
BELLEGARDE-SMITH, HAITI: THE BREACHED CITADEL 70 (1990); see ALEX DupuY, HITI IN
THE WORLD ECONOMY (1989) (explaining Haiti's development from socio-economic
standpoint and discussing roles of four actors). Historically, Haitian governments were
weak and up until the 1990 elections the Haitian army and elite were controlled by
Haitian politics. Dupuy, supra, at 117-118. Furthermore, since its independence in
1804 Haiti has had 44 rulers or presidents, over three-quarters of whom were either
killed or overthrown. Id. at 119. Haiti had the added burden of a small elite dominat-
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to the United Nations short of the use of force and military inter-
vention to resolve Haiti's quagmire. 7 Ultimately, the sanctions
did not achieve their objective in Haiti, to remove the military
dictatorship.8
The implications of Haiti's highly stratified society, violent
past, inadequate or nonexistent government, and the resulting
coup comprised a new and unanticipated scenario for the
United Nations.9 Haiti's sanctions episode, furthermore, came
at a time when the United Nations was focusing on peace and
security issues.' 0 With the number of failed states on the rise,'
ing the rest of the Haitian population, with little interest in promoting a national iden-
tity, economy, and a more equal society. Mintz, supra, at 79, 81-82. The elite pursued a
subtle form of plundering, encouraging the economy for their own benefit without
investing in anything that would benefit overall society. Id. at 86; see generally Dupuv,
supra (discussing emergence and evolution of Haitian elite). The dire economic, so-
cial, and political circumstances created huge waves of refugees, including the boat
people. BELLEGARDE-SMITH, supra, at 124-125. Boat People refers to thousands of Hai-
tians who fled Haiti in the 1980s and 1990s in makeshift boats in direction of the
United States. Rapporteur Special de la Commission des Droits de L'Homme, Note du
Secritaire GOnirale d I' Assemble Cinbrale, Transmettant le Rapport Provisoire Etabli par le Rap-
porteur Spicial de la Commission des Droits de l'Homme sur la Situation des Droits de l'Homme en
Haiti, U.N. Doc. A/47/621 (1992) in LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 229,
235.
7. See LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 4 (asserting that international
community had eliminated possibility of using force to remove military defacto govern-
ment and was therefore left with sanctions as only means with which to resolve Haiti's
crisis). See Miroslav Nincic and Peter Wallensteen, Economic Coercion and Foreign Policy, in
DILEMMAS OF ECONOMIC COERCION: SANCTIONS IN WORLD POLITICS 1, 3-4 (Miroslav
Nincic and Peter Wallensteen, eds., 1983) (describing economic sanctions as belonging
to continuum of foreign policy instruments distinguished by coerciveness, with eco-
nomic sanctions lying between diplomatic bargaining and use of military force).
8. See LES NATIONS UN1ES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 4-5 (positing that sanctions
seemed more effective as threats than as actual policy tools). Cf Larry Rohter, Haitian
Military Rulers Agree to Leave; Clinton Calls Off Plans for US Invasion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
1994, at Al, A8 (discussing settlement negotiated with Haitian junta by former Presi-
dent Carter, Senator Nunn, and former U.S. Chief of Staff Colin Powell); Larry Rohter,
2,000 Troops Land Without Opposition and Take Over Haiti's Ports and Airfields, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1994, at Al (reporting on arrival of American troops to enforce negotiated
settlement). Former President Carter had established a reputation as an effective for-
eign policy trouble shooter, negotaing, for instance, with regimes in North Korea and
Sudan. See Douglas Brinkley, Jimmy Carter's Modest Quest for Global Peace, 74 FOREIGN AFr.
6, 90, 92 (1995) (listing disputes former President Carter mediated).
9. See LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 3 (stating that United Nations
embarked on an unprecedented journey when it responded to crisis in Haiti). See Mad-
eleine K. Albright, International Law Approaches the Twenty-First Century: A U.S. Perspective
on Enforcement, 18 FoR.DHAm INT'L L.J. 1595, 1602 (1995) (discussing uniqueness of Haiti
scenario).
10. See Boutros BoLrrRos-GHALi, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY,
PEACEMAKING AND PEAcE-KEEPING, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (1992) reprinted in AN
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the United Nations is fulfilling roles its founding member states
may not have anticipated in 1945, but ultimately provided for in
varying degrees under the U.N. Charter.1 2 From 1991 to 1994,
United Nations' activities in Haiti included election monitor-
ing," the use of a regional arrangement, the Organization of
American States ("OAS"),14 human rights monitoring, 15 preven-
AGENDA FOR PEACE 1995, U.N. Sales No. E.95.I.15 (2nd ed. 1995) [hereinafter AN
AGENDA FOR PEACE] (setting out ways to strengthen and make more efficient U.N.'s
capacity in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-keeping fields).
11. See BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, SUPPLEMENT TO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: POSITION
PAPER OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE OCCASION OF THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS at 8-12, U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, reprinted in AN AGENDA
FOR PEACE 1995, U.N. Sales No. E.95.I.15 (2nd ed. 1995) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENT TO
AN AGENDA FOR PEACE] (discussing rise in number of intra-state conflicts since end of
Cold War).
12. See id. at 8-22 (discussing emergence of new role for United Nations includ-
ing promotion of national reconciliation and re-establishment of effective govern-
ment).
13. G.A. Res. 45/2, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 154, U.N. Doc. A/45/2
(1990), reprinted in LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 150-151. United Na-
tions Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti ("ONUVEH") repre-
sented the second time in the United Nations' history that a government had requested
that the United Nations monitor elections. United Nations Department of Public Infor-
mation, United Nations Electoral Assistance to Haiti, U.N. Doc. DPI/1120 (1991), at 2
[hereinafter Electoral Assistance]. The first instance of such a request came when Nicara-
gua asked for U.N. monitors to monitor the 1990 Nicaraguan election. Id. Ertha Pas-
cale Trouillot, the head of the then provisional government of Haiti, requested in the
spring of 1990 that an observer group supervise the forthcoming presidential and legis-
lative elections. Id. In October of 1990, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 45/
2, asking the Secretary General to "provide the broadest possible support to the Govern-
ment of Haiti." Note by the Secretary-General: Special Economic and Disaster Relief Assistance,
Electoral Assistance to Haiti, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Items 86 and 154 at 1, U.N.
Doc. A/45/870/Add.1 (1991).
14. See OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs, MRE/RES. 1/91 (1991) (condemning
overthrow and calling on all member states to suspend economic, financial and com-
mercial ties, and any aid and technical assistance and cooperation except that provided
strictly for humanitarian purposes); see OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs, MRE/RES. 2/
91 (1991) (urging member states to freeze Haiti's assets, to impose trade embargo, and
eventually to set up civilian mission in Haiti to monitor human rights abuses). The
Organization of American States ("OAS") also proposed to forward the resolution to
the United Nations and to encourage the United Nations to request that its members
adopt the same measures. Id.
15. See G.A- Res. 47/20B, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 22, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/47/20 (1993), reprinted in LEs NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 290-291
(authorizing participation of United Nations in OAS monitoring mission); see Rapport
du Secritaire GAnrale d l'Assemblie GnArale, Recommendant la Criation de la Composante ONU
d'une Mission Civile Internationale Mixte ONU/OEA en Haiti, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/
47/908 (1993), in LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 258-275 (providing
framework for sending in monitoring force to monitor human rights violations). Ini-
tially referred to by the acronym OEA/DEMOC, the mission became known as the Mis-
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tive diplomacy," sanctions, 17 military intervention, 8 and state-
sion Civile en Haiti ("MICIVIH") once the United Nations took over. Mission Civile
Internationale en Haiti, OEA/ONU: Termes de Rifkrence (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) [hereinafter Termes de Rifrence]. Under Chapter VIII of the U.N.
Charter, specifically Articles 52 and 53, the United Nations has a duty to make full use
of the regional organizations primarily for the maintenance of international peace and
security. U.N. CHARTER arts. 52, 53. The United Nations left most of the burden of
finding a solution to the Haitian crisis on the OAS, and initially only passed a few Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions condemning the coup or encouraging support for the OAS
sanctions. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 46/7, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 145, U.N. Doc.
A/46/7 (1991), reprinted in LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 204 (proclaim-
ing that U.N. Secretary General would provide support OAS Secretary General sought).
One of the more active measures the United Nations adopted prior to imposing sanc-
tions was to participate, at the behest of Aristide, in the OAS' human rights monitoring
mission as part of a political solution to reinstate Aristide. G.A. Res. 47/20B. The U.N.
General Assembly allocated US$19.1 million to the mission and allowed 130 U.N.
monitors to join 130 OAS monitors in Haiti. General Assembly Approves Joint UNIOAS
Civilian Mission to Haiti, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 100th plen. mtg., Press Release, U.N.
Doc. GA/8482 (1993). The objective of the mission was to monitor and report any
violations of human rights laid out in the Haitian Constitution, or any other interna-
tional human rights treaty to which Haiti was a party, to the relevant international orga-
nizations while also making recommendations to the Haitian authorities who were com-
mitting abuses. Termes de Refrence.
16. See G.A. Res. 47/20A, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 22, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/47/20 (1992), reprinted in LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 247-48
(following which U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Special En-
voy Dante Caputo in December 1992 to pursue solution to Haiti's political crisis
through diplomatic talks). In cooperation with the OAS, the United Nations and its
Special Envoy explored a negotiated political settlement to try and resolve Haiti's polit-
ical crisis between PresidentJean-Bertrand Aristide and the defacto military authorities.
See, e.g., Letter from Raoul Cidras, Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces to the Spe-
cialEnvoy (Jan. 16, 1993), reprinted in LES NATIONS UNIFS ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 252-
253 (discussing meeting between Special Envoy, Dante Caputo, and Haitian Com-
mander-in-Chief, Raoul C~dras, to try and find solution to Haitian crisis through con-
structive dialogue); Letter from De Facto Haitian Prime Minister, Mr. Marc Bazin, to the Spe-
cialEnvoy (Jan. 17, 1993), reprinted in LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 253
(mentioning offer Special Envoy made to defacto and dejure Haitian governments to
facilitate dialogue between them through the auspices of United Nations and OAS to
resolve Haiti's political crisis). By June of 1993, when the United Nations imposed
mandatory sanctions on Haiti, Caputo had been trying for seven months to broker an
agreement with the military. United Nations Department of Public Information, LES
NATIONS UNIES ET LA SITUATION EN HAITI 5 (1995) [hereinafter LA SITUATION EN HAITI].
Once the United Nations decided to impose the sanctions on Haiti pursuant to Resolu-
tion 841 (1993) and showed its resolve, the de facto Haitian military government suc-
cumbed immediately and signed an agreement on Governors Island in New York on
July 3, 1993. Governors Island Agreement, in Report of the Secretary General: The Situation of
Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, General Assembly, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 22, at
2-5, Security Council, 48th Sess., at 2-5, U.N. Doc. A/47/975-S/26063 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Governors Island Agreement]. The Agreement, a political truce, set up a ten-step
plan to restore Democracy in Haiti, primarily by resolving the Parliamentary crisis un-
derway in Haiti at the time, allowing the selection and ratification of a Prime Minister,
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building.19
This Note analyzes the United Nations' use of sanctions in
Haiti to draw lessons for the future use of sanctions20 and argues
that there is an inherent tension in the Charter between meas-
ures called for under Article 4121 and the United Nations' obli-
gations under Article 55.22 Part I of this Note presents the back-
and preparing the way for the return of Aristide. Id. Until the Security Council
adopted Resolution 940 onJuly 31, 1994, to allow for the use of a multinational force to
reinstate President Aristide, the Governors Island Agreement was hailed as the only
framework in which to solve Haiti's crisis. See S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 3413th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994) (citing Governors Island Accord as framework to rein-
state democracy in Haiti).
17. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 2; S.C. Res. 917, supra'note 3.
18. See S.C. Res. 940, supra note 16, 1 4 (providing for multinational force to re-
move the defacto military authorities and to reinstate President Aristide). The Resolu-
tion allowed for the use of all necessary means to achieve its objectives. 1d. Pursuant to
Resolution 940, a multinational force led by the United States, landed in Haiti on Sep-
tember 19, 1994. LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAiI, supra note 4, at 64.
19. Governors Island Agreement, supra note 16. The fifth step of the Governors Island
Agreement provided for the U.N. to assist in the modernization of the Haitian Armed
Forces and the establishment of an official police force. Id. at 5. To this end the
Agreement recommended that a combined police monitoring and military personnel
U.N. force, U.N. Mission in Haiti ("UNMIH") be deployed in Haiti by the U.N. member
states. Id. Security Council Resolution 867 (1993) approved the deployment of UN-
MIH in Haiti by October 1993. S.C. Res. 867, U.N. SCOR, 3282nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/867 (1993). The deployment never occured but the Security Council eventually
expanded UNMIH's mandate and size to create the U.N. peacekeeping force in Haiti.
S.C. Res. 940, supra note 16. The size of UNMIH decreased and a smaller force, the
Mission d'Appui des Nations Unies en Haiti (MANUH) succeeded UNMIH in July
1996. S.C. Res. 1063, U.N. SCOR, 3676th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1063 (1996), reprinted
in LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 613-614. MANUH's mandate consisted
of training a professional Haitian police force and of helping other U.N. Agencies to
reinforce Haitian government institutions and to promote economic development. Id.
20. See SUPPLEMENT TO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 11, at 8 (reporting that
continuing rise in number of sanctions regimes imposed by Security Council). The
number of sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council increased from one as of
January 1988, to two as ofJanuary 1992, to seven as ofJanuary 1994. Id.
21. U.N. CHARTER art. 41. Article 41 states:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may
include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea,
air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations.
Id.
22. U.N. CHARTER art. 55. Article 55 states:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on re-
spect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the
United Nations shall promote:
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ground and the legal bases for U.N. sanctions. Part I also dis-
cusses the adoption of measures to solve Haiti's crisis outside of
and within the Chapter VII 5 framework of the U.N. Charter.
Part II examines the debate surrounding the use of sanctions to
solve Haiti's crisis. Part III argues that the U.N. imposed sanc-
tions undermined the organization's mandate to promote Ha-
iti's economic and social development pursuant to Article 55 of
the Charter. Part III also suggests that due to the lack of en-
forcement alternatives available to the United Nations to main-
tain international peace and security, the United Nations needs
to improve its procedural mechanisms for the implementation
and monitoring of sanctions. This Note concludes that, while
sanctions are viable policy tools, the United Nations must apply
the sanctions within the limits set out in Article 5524 of the U.N.
Charter.
I. SANCTIONS: COLLECTIVE MEASURES
Although the U.N. Charter permits the use of collective
sanctions as a means to promote international peace and secur-
ity, the United Nations only recently began to actively use collec-
tive sanctions. 25 Collective sanctions provide the United Nations
with an alternative to the use of force and have a stronger impact
than diplomatic condemnation or isolation. 26 The recent surge
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of eco-
nomic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or reli-
gion.
Id.
23. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51. Chapter VII refers to actions taken with respect to
threats to the peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. Id.
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, supra note 22.
25. SUPPLEMENT TO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 11, at 8. The number of
sanctions regimes imposed by the U.N. Security Council rose from one in 1988 to seven
in 1994. Id. See James C. Ngobi, The United Nations Experience with Sanctions, in Eco-
NOMIC SANCTIONS: PANACEA OR PEACEBUILDING IN A POST-COLD WAR WORLD? 17, 17-18
(David Cortright & George A. Lopez eds., 1995) [hereinafter ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:
PANACEA OR PEACEBUILDING?] (listing sanctions imposed by United Nations since 1990,
including sanctions against Iraq, former Yugoslvia, Serbia, Montenegro, Libya, Somalia,
Liberia, Cambodia, Haiti, Angola, and Rwanda).
26. George A. Lopez and David Cortright, Economic Sanctions in Contemporary Global
Relations, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: PANACEA OR PACEBUILDING?, supra note 25, at 3, 5.
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in the use of collective sanctions stems from a number of factors,
notably the fall in unilateral sanctions due to the end of the Cold
War, an increase in the volume of international trade, and the
growing interest of the international community to cooperate in
rectifying violations of international legal norms.27
A. Multinational Organizations
Multinational organizations seek to respond to the needs of
the international community through multilateral and intergov-
ernmental cooperation.2 8 The number of multinational organi-
zations has risen from thirty at the beginning of the twentieth
century to several hundred by 1990.29 The multinational organi-
zations can either be global or regional in geographic focus, bi-
lateral or multilateral in membership, and multi-purpose or sin-
gle-purpose in scope.3"
1. The United Nations
Founded in 1945, the United Nations emerged in response
to World War II, as a successor to the League of Nations.3' The
United Nations' primary objective is the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security.32 The U.N. Charter enumerated the
27. Id. at 5-6.
28. See generally MiHaLv Siam, THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: MANAGING
RISK AND CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (1994) (discussing multilateral and in-
tergovernmental institutions and their roles).
29. Id. at 263.
30. Id. at 266. The United Nations, for instance, is a global multi-purpose inter-
governmental organization. U.N. CHARTER, pmbl., arts. 1, 2. The Organization of
American States is a regional multipurposed intergovernmental organization. CHARTER
OF THE ORGANIZATION Or AMERICAN STATES, Apr. 30 1948, T.S. No. 1-F, OEA/Ser.A/2
(English) Rev. 4 [hereinafter OAS CHARTER]. Protocol to Amend the OAS Charter
"Protocol of Buenos Aires," February 27, 1967. Id. Protocol to Amend OAS Charter
"Protocol of Cartegena de Indias," December 5, 1985. Id. OAS CHARTER Preamble, art.
2.
31. See ROBERT E. RIGGS & JACK C. PIANO, THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 1-19 (1988) (discussing history of United Nations).
The League of Nations emerged following World War I, in response to a reaction
against war. ADAM WATSON, DIPLOMACY: THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN STATES 117 (1982). Its
ultimate goal was to maintain peace and prevent future aggression. Id. The League of
Nations ultimately failed for a number of reasons, most notably that the great powers at
the time, including the United States, Russia, Japan, and Germany did not take part in
the League. Id. This left very weak Britain and France to further the principles of the
League. Id. at 118.
32. See Asbjorn Eide, Outlawing the Use of Force: The Efforts by the United Nations, in
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 99,
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purposes of the United Nations and provided an organizational
framework in which to pursue those purposes.3 3 Fifty-one states
signed and ratified the U.N. Charter in 1945, creating a U.N.
system to regulate interstate affairs through the establishment of
a benevolent international legal order.34 As of 1996 the United
Nations had 185 members35 and found itself increasingly coping
with intrastate affairs that constituted threats to international
peace and security.36
a. Purposes of the United Nations
According to Article 1 of the U.N. Charter, 3  the United Na-
tions has three main purposes, notably the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security,R the equality and self-determina-
tion of peoples,3 9 and the cooperation of the U.N. member
states to resolve international economic, social, cultural, or hu-
99 (United Nations' Institute for Training and Research ed., 1987) (discussing United
Nations' goal of creating new legal order).
33. See generally U.N. CHARTER (setting out purposes and organizational framework
of United Nations).
34. RIGGS & PANO, supra note 31, at 19.
35. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE & MANATU AORERE,
UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK 11 (1996) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK].
36. SUPPLEMENT TO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 11, 11. Of the five U.N.
peacekeeping operations existing in early 1988, only one related to an intrastate con-
flict. Id. Of the 21 operations established since then, only eight are related to interstate
wars and the remaining 13 are related to intrastate wars. Id.
37. U.N CHARTER art. 1. Article 1 states:
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the prin-
ciples of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of interna-
tional disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the princi-
ple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appro-
priate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of
these common ends.
Id.
38. Id. at 1.
39. Id. at 2.
1888 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:1878
manitarian problems and to promote human rights.4" The U.N.
Charter lists the three purposes, in order of importance, so that
the maintenance of international peace and security supersedes
the purpose of development.4" The three purposes, however,
are interrelated, and the latter two, equality and self-determina-
tion of peoples and economic development, contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security.4 2 Ultimately,
economic development has become as important to the United
Nations' mission as maintaining international peace and secur-
ity.4" The United Nations' purposes set out in the Charter deter-
mine the power of the United Nations and assign to the U.N.
organs their functions and responsibilities."
b. Structure of the United Nations
The U.N. Charter set up an organizational structure consist-
ing of six principal organs to help the United Nations fulfill its
purposes.45 The General Assembly4" consists of all Member
40. Id. at 3.
41. See Mohammed Bedjaoui, Chapitre P Buts et Principes - Article I Commentaire
Gnral, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIEs 24, 24 (Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet eds.,
1991) (discussing India's proposal during drafting of U.N. Charter that purposes of
United Nations be put in logical rather than political order). India suggested that the
maintenance of peace and security be listed last given that it is the United Nations'
ultimate purpose and that the other two purposes contribute to the maintenance of
peace and security. Id.
42. Alain Pellet, Chapitre IX Cooperation Economique et Sociale - Article 55, in LA
CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES, supra note 41, at 843, 847.
43. Id. at 847. "The promotion of economic and social progress is one of the
United Nations' primary objectives, enshrined in the Charter." Renewing the United Na-
tions, supra note 1, 68. Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote:
Development is the most important task facing humanity today. Yet, as the
United Nations celebrates its fiftieth anniversary, we are in danger of losing
sight of such an essential task. Beset by the growth of conflicts, and the neces-
sity to maintain the peace in the tense post-cold war environment, we risk
getting lost in the urgency of peace-keeping, at the expense of the longer term
development effort.
BoUTROs Bou-rRoS-GHALi, AN AGENDA FOR DEVELOPMENT at 1, U.N. Sales No. E.95.I.16
(1995) [hereinafter AN AGENDA FOR DEVELOPMENT].
Boutros-Ghali commented that "[t]he Security Council, through the provisions of
Chapter VII, can adversely affect the course of development within States to which sanc-
tions apply, as well as in neighbouring states." An Agenda for Development: Report of the
Secretary-General at 143, U.N. Doc. A/48/935, reprinted in AN AGENDA FOR DEVELOP-
MENT, supra note 43.
44. See Mohammed Bedjaoui, supra note 41, at 28 (discussing impact of three pur-
poses set out in U.N. Charter).
45. U.N. CHARTER art. 7, 1.
1997] U.N. SANCTIONS IN HAITI 1889
States and is the representative body of the United Nations.47
With the exception of overseeing the budget,48 the General As-
sembly's functions are limited to discussing issues within the
scope of the U.N. Charter,4 9 considering general principles of
co-operation in the field of international peace and security,"
initiating studies, and making recommendations. 51 The Security
Council,5 consisting of five permanent members53 and ten non-
permanent members elected for two year terms by the General
Assembly,54 is a political organ whose primary function is to over-
see the maintenance of international peace and security through
either dispute settlement or other concerted actions.55 The Eco-
nomic and Social Council ("ECOSOC")5 6 coordinates develop-
ment activities.5 7 The Trusteeship Council5  assists in the admin-
istration and supervision of trust territories.59 The International
46. See U.N. CHARTER Chapter IV, arts. 9-22 (setting out composition, functions,
powers, voting, and various procedures of General Assembly).
47. U.N. CHARTER art. 9.
48. U.N. CHARTER art. 17.
49. U.N. CHARTER art. 10.
50. U.N. CHARTER art. 11.
51. U.N. CHARTER arts. 13, 14. The General Assembly, however, may not make
recommendations regarding a dispute or a situation the Security Council is overseeing,
unless the Security Council so requests. U.N. CHARTER art. 12, 1.
52. See U.N. CHARTER Chapter V, arts. 23-32 (setting out composition, functions,
powers, voting, and procedures of Security Council).
53. U.N. CHARTER art. 23,1 1. The five permanent members of the Security Coun-
cil are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
54. Id.
55. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1 1.
56. See U.N.. CHARTER Chapter X, arts. 61-72 (setting out composition, functions,
powers, voting, and procedures of the Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC")).
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 62. To assist it in carrying out its tasks, ECOSOC can set up
commissions in economic and social fields. U.N. CHARTER art. 68. Furthermore,
ECOSOC can enter into consultation agreements with non-governmental organizations
that work in the field of human rights or economic and social development. U.N.
CHARTER art. 71. ECOSOC can enter into similar arrangments with international or
national organizations, provided that the United Nations consult the Member State
concerned prior to entering into such an arrangement. Id. Finally ECOSOC can sup-
ply information to the Security Council. U.N. CHARTER art. 65.
58. U.N. CHARTER Chapters XII-XIII, arts. 75-91.
59. U.N. CHARTER art. 87. Trust territories refer to territories placed under the
trusteeship system to be supervised and administered by the United Nations Trustee-
ship Council. U.N. CHARTER art. 75. The territories which could be placed under the
trusteeship system were either territories held under mandate, territories which could
be detached from enemy states as a result of World War II, and territories voluntarily
placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. U.N. CHARTER
art. 77. In 1994 the U.N. Secretary General recommended that the trusteeship system
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Court of Justice ("ICJ")6 ° is the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations, 61 deciding, in accordance with international
law, disputes arising between states.62 Finally, the Secretariat,63
consisting of the Secretary-General and a staff,64 carries out the
programs of the United Nations and performs administrative,
budgetary, secretarial, linguistic, staff, and housekeeping func-
tions.65 The Secretary-General heads the Secretariat and is the
chief administrative officer of the United Nations.66 The Secre-
tariat includes a number of offices and departments such as the
Office of Legal Affairs, the Department of Political Affairs, the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Department
of Humanitarian Affairs.67 The Department of Humanitarian
Affairs ("DHA") was created to coordinated the United Nations'
humanitarian activities.6 8
Pursuant to Article 22 of the U.N. Charter, the General As-
sembly may create any subsidiary organs necessary to help it ac-
complish its tasks.69 As a result, since 1948, the General Assem-
bly has established several hundred subsidiary organs including
temporary budgetary committees and political commissions.7"
be abolished in accordance with Article 108 of the U.N. Charter. UNITED NATIONS
HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 149.
60. See U.N. CHARTER Chapter XIV, arts. 92-96 (providing basic framework for role
of International Court ofJustice ("ICJ")); see U.N. CHARTER annex, Statute of the Interna-
tional Court ofJustice (setting out organization, competence, and procedure of Interna-
tional Court of Justice).
61. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
62. U.N. CHARTER annex, Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1).
63. See U.N. CHARTER Chapter XV, arts. 97-101 (setting out composition, functions,
and powers of Secretariat).
64. U.N. CHARTER art. 97. Article 97 states: "[t]he Secretariat shall comprise a Sec-
retary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General
shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security
Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization." Id.
65. RIGGS AND PLANO, supra note 31 at 47.
66. U.N. CHARTER art. 97, supra note 64.
67. UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 159-160.
68. See Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the
United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 44, at
4, 1 8, U.N. Doc. A/48/536 (1993) [hereinafter Humanitarian Assistance: Report of the
Secretary-General] (stating that "[t]he Department of Humanitarian Affairs was estab-
lished by the Secretary-General as the focal point for humanitarian affairs within the
United Nations system to facilitate a timely and coordinated system-wide response to
disasters. The Department also serves as an advocate for the humanitarian mandate of
the United Nations.").
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 22.
70. See Jacqueline Dutheil de la Roch~re, Article 22, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS
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The most important subsidiary organs to emerge pursuant to Ar-
ticle 22 are the Specialized Agencies created in the area of eco-
nomic and social development. 7'
The Specialized Agencies have more complex structures
than other U.N. organs, far-reaching mandates, and receive fi-
nancing primarily from voluntary contributions by member
states and not from the regular U.N. budget. 72 Moreover, the
Specialized Agencies have a special relationship with ECOSOC.73
ECOSOC defines the terms under which the Specialized Agen-
cies are brought into the U.N. system,74 coordinates the activities
of the Agencies,75 and may obtain reports from the Agencies.76
The Bretton Woods Institutions are the final component of
the U.N. system.77 These institutions resulted from the 1944
Bretton Woods Monetary and Financial Conference. 7  The In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD")
emerged as the principal unit of the United Nations' lending
system.79 Comprised of the International Monetary Fund
("IMF") and the World Bank Group, ° the Bretton Woods Insti-
UNIs, supra note 41, at 421, 423-424 (outlining general types of subsidiary organs Gen-
eral Assembly has created since 1948).
71. Id. at 423. See U.N. CHARTER art. 57 (describing scope ofspecialized agencies
and placement in U.N. system).
72. Dutheil de la Roch6re, supra note 70, at 423. The main Specialized Agencies
functioning in Haiti and providing humanitarian assistance in Haiti throughout the
embargo were the United Nations Development Program ("UNDP"), the World Food
Program ("WFP"), United Nations Children Fund ("UNICEF"), the United Nations
Population Fund ("UNFPA"), the Food and Agricultural Organization ("FAO") and the
World Health Organization ("WHO") through the Pan-American Health Organization
("PAHO"). See USAID, HAITI: MONITORING REPORT OCTOBER 1994, at 10 (setting out
amounts of contributions of each agency for year); see also An Agenda for Development:
Report of the Secretary General, supra note 43, at 228 (stating that with its global network
of field offices, UNDP is in unique position to help United Nations respond "flexibly
and rapidly to changing national priorities").
73. U.N. CHARTER arts. 62-64, 66, 1 1.
74. U.N. CHARTER art. 63, 1.
75. U.N. CHARTER art. 63, 2.
76. U.N. CHARTER art. 64, 1.
77. ERSKINE CHILDERS & BRIAN URQUHART, RENEWING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
25 (1994).
78. See RIGGS & P.ANO, supra note 31, at 294 (discussing creation of Bretton Woods
Institutions).
79. Id. at 336.
80. CHILDERS & URQUHART, supra note 77 at 25. The World Bank Group includes
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD"), the main com-
mercial-rate lending bank, the soft-loan International Development Association
("IDA"), and the International Finance Corporation ("IFC"). Id.
1997] 1891
1892 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:1878
tutions have budgets and voting procedures separate from those
of the United Nations.81
2. The Organization of American States
Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter provides for the integra-
tion of regional arrangements into the U.N. system, to assist in
maintaining international peace and security.8 2 The Charter
does not define the term regional arrangement and only con-
cedes, in Article 52, that a regional arrangement must assist in
maintaining international peace and security and that the re-
gional arrangement's activities must be consistent with the pur-
poses of the United Nations.8" Regional arrangements can only
undertake pacific settlement of disputes,84 and must get permis-
sion from the Security Council to undertake enforcement ac-
tion, except under very limited circumstances. 85 Regional orga-
81. Id.
82. U.N. CHARTER Chapter VIII, arts. 52-54.
83. See Edem Kodjo, Chapitre VIII: Accords Rigionaux - Article 52, in LA CHARTE DES
NATIONS UNIES, supra note 41. at 798, 802-805 (discussing different scholars' views on
what constitutes regional arrangement under U.N. Charter).
84. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, 2 and 52, 3. Article 52 states:
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrange-
ments or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance
of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, pro-
vided that such arragements or agencies and their activities are consistent with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or
constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement
of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional
agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement
of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional
agencies either on the initative of the states concerned or by reference from
the Security Council.
4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.
U.N. CHARTER art. 52.
85. U.N. CHARTER art. 53, 1. Article 53 establishes that:
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional ar-
rangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by re-
gional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the
exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of
this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangments
directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state,
until such time as the Organization may, on rquest of the Governments con-
cerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by
such a state.
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nizations' abilities to pursue pacific settlements to disputes are
subordinated to the Security Council's authority under Article
52(4) allowing the Security Council to investigate any dispute.86
Article 33(1) of the U.N. Charter lists resort to regional agencies
as one of the options U.N. members should consider in trying to
resolve disputes through pacific means.87
The OAS is the world's oldest regional organization,88 dat-
ing back to the First International Conference of American
States89 held from October 1889 to April 1890.90 The OAS Char-
ter entered into force in 1951.91 The OAS' membership consists
of thirty-two American and Carribean states.9 2
The OAS was founded primarily as a collective defense sys-
tem for the maintenance of peace and security in the Ameri-
cas .93 Until recently, the OAS subordinated its other objectives
to the collective defense objective.9 4 Due to the region's past his-
tory, intervention was a serious concern of the founders of the
OAS. 95 Scholars hold that the OAS has been most effective in its
crisis management role, and that the United Nations has given
the OAS considerable leeway to fulfill its pacifying role.96 The
2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any
state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory
of the present Charter.
U.N. CHARTER art. 53.
86. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, 4, supra note 84.
87. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, 1. "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice." Id.
88. OAS CHARTER, supra note 30 (editorial statement at endleaf).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. (listing members of OAS).
93. Id.
94. See Aida Luisa Levin, The Organization of American States and the United Nations:
Relations in the Peace and Security Field, in REGIONALISM AND THE UNrrED NATIONS, 147,
147-224 (Berhanykun Andemicael, ed., 1979) (analyzing role of OAS in maintaining
international peace and security in Americas). Between 1948, date of the founding of
the OAS and 1960 for instance, the United Nations did not involve itself in inter-Ameri-
can conflicts, with the exception of Guatemala in 1954. Id. at 151.
95. See Lori F. Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influ-
ence Over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (1989) (discussing non-intervention
norm in OAS Charter and stating that due to their past history, Latin American states
contributed substantially to legal development of non-intervention norm).
96. Levin, supra note 94, at 151.
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OAS Charter explicitly states that the OAS functions within the
framework of the United Nations under Article 136.9 7 The OAS
is a system for pacific dispute settlement and collective self-de-
fense, and not an expansive system of collective security like the
United Nations.98 This precludes the OAS, for instance, from
using sanctions as a form of economic coercion pursuant to Arti-
cles 18 and 19 of the OAS Charter.99
B. Sanctions
Nation-states are opting more frequently for sanctions to re-
solve national and international crises.100 The international
community cooperates to impose sanctions in an attempt to de-
ter and rectify violations of international legal norms.10 1 Despite
commentators questionning the political efficacy of economic
sanctions,1 0 2 the international community prefers them to the
use of force and the direct intervention in a country's internal
affairs.103
97. OAS CHARTER, supra note 30, art. 136. "None of the provisions of this Charter
shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the Member States under
the Charter of the United Nations." Id.
98. See Domingo E. Acevado, The U.S. Measures Resulting from the Malvinas Conflict,
28 AM. J. Ir'L L. 323, 331 n.23 (stating that despite use of expression "collective secur-
ity" in OAS Chater, OAS is only self-defense organization).
99. OAS CHARTER, supra note 30, arts. 18, 19. Article 18 of the OAS Charter states:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The
foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of
interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against
its political, economic, and cultural elements.
Id. art. 18. "No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an eco-
nomic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and
obtain from it advantages of any kind." Id. art. 19.
100. See SUPPLEMENT TO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10, at 8 (reporting that
Security Council had imposed one sanction regime in 1988 compared to seven in
1994).
101. See id. at 1 68 (stating that purpose of sanctions is to modify and not to punish
behavior of party that is threatening international peace and security).
102. See, e.g., id. at 70 (discussing various drawbacks of economic sanctions).
103. See G.C. HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, VOLUME 1:
HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 11 (2nd ed. 1990) [hereinafter ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RE.
CONSIDERED] (contending that sanctions are surrogate for other measures, including
more extreme measures such as covert actions or other military interventions). Eco-
nomic sanctions were used occasionally prior to World War I. Id. at 28-31. The Ameri-
can colonies used sanctions to retaliate against the British. Id. at 28. The British used
sanctions to contain French expansion during the Napoleonic wars. Id. at 29. The
Northern States of the United States used sanctions against the Confederate States dur-
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1.. Types of Sanctions
Sanctions are an alternative form of intervention1 4 to the
use of force and governments have been using them since na-
tion states came into existence. 10 5 Without resorting to force, a
nation applying sanctions appears to be taking decisive action in
trying to resolve a dilemma by applying sanctions, whether diplo-
matic, financial, or economic in nature. 106 Actors fall within two
broad categories, the sender state (s) which imposes the sanc-
tions and the target state(s) on which the sanctions will be im-
posed.10
7
In recent years scholars have propounded a number of spe-
ing the Civil War. Id. at 30. The Russians used sanctions against the Japanese during
the Russo-Japanese war at the turn of the century. Id. at 31. Whereas prior to World
War II, nation-states used sanctions mostly during periods of warfare, or generally to
prevent or further hegemonic, expansionist or colonial objectives, since World War II
there has been a rise in the use of economic sanctions as moral fronts for other reasons
such as improving human rights. See id. at 5 (stating that through World War II "the
objectives sought with the use of sanctions retained a distinctly martial flavor."). There
are numerous examples in the late 1970s and early 1980s of the use of sanctions, partic-
ularly by the United States, to improve human rights in Uruguay, in Guatemala, in the
former Soviet Union, and in Haiti. G.C. HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECON-
SIDERED: SUPPLEMENTAL CASE HISTORIES (2nd ed. 1990) [hereinafter ECONOMIC SANC-
TIONs RECONSIDERED, SUPPLEMENT] at 417-21, 438-44, 487-91, 598-605. Other examples
of the use of sanctions to improve human rights include the European Community
imposing sanctions on Turkey to restore democracy, and the United States and the
United Kingdom using sanctions against Somalia to improve human rights and to end
the civil war. Id. at 532-36, 619-24.
104. See, 33.D STRATEGY FOR PEACE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY CONFERENCE, THE UNITED
NATIONS AND MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS: NEW OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY? 7 (1992) [here-
inafter THE UNITED NATIONS AND MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS] (claiming that sanctions
are attractive enforcement option available to U.N. member states because member
states can stop sanctions short of warfare and invoke sanctions at low cost to most of
member states who cast votes). Sanctions are often referred to as foreign policy on the
cheap. Id. George Schultz referred to them as light-switch diplomacy. See Donald L.
Losman, A Look at... The Case Against Sanctions: Good Intentions Gone Bad; Punitive Trade
Embargoes are Appealing, but they don't Achieve our Goals, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1996, at C3
(referring to former Secretary of State George Schultz's comments that commercial
relations cannot be turned on and off because of sanctions episode).
105. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 103, at 28. Around 432 B.C.
for instance, Athens limited the entry of Megara's products into Athenian markets in
retaliation for Megara's kidnapping of three women and for attempting to confiscate
Athenian territory. Id. The decree was said to have eventually contributed to the Pelo-
ponnesian war between Athens and Sparta. Id.
106. See id. at 11 (arguing that sanctions are generally imposed on target for three
reasons, notably, to deter target state from pursuing any objectionable policies, to
demonstrate resolve of sender state to rectify situation, and as substitute for other meas-
ures).
107. See id. at 36 (defining sender as "the country (or international organization)
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cific definitions of economic sanctions.1"8 Due to the lack of
consensus as to what constitutes sanctions, there is no clear-cut
definition of the purpose and objectives of sanctions. 109 Sanc-
tions are not objectives in themselves, but rather policy instru-
ments to achieve certain objectives.110
Regardless of sanctions' objectives, the only sanction tools
short of warfare are economic ones subject to general economic
exchange.1 Both political and economic variables therefore
can influence the effectiveness of sanctions. 12 Various methods
that is the principal author of the sanctions episode," and target as "the country that is
the immediate object of the episode").
108. Compare Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphaz-
ard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1162, 1166 (defining economic sanctions as "coer-
cive economic measures taken against one or more countries to attempt to force a
change in policies, or at least to demonstrate the sanctioning country's opinion of an-
other's policies") and ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 103, at 2 (defin-
ing economic sanctions as "deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of
withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations") with MARGARET DoxsE, ECO-
NOMIC SANCTIONS & INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 1 (1971) (defining sanctions as "con-
formity-defending instruments relating to behavior which is expected by custom or re-
quired by law") and MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE 13
(1990) (defining economic sanctions as:
[A]ny country-specific economic or financial prohibition imposed upon a tar-
get country or its nationals with the intended effect of creating dysfunction in
commercial and financial transactions with respect to the specified target in
the service of specified foreign policy purposes. The term sanction in the pres-
ent context therefore includes a range of trade and financial measures that
may be imposed in varying combinations, administered by a number of agen-
cies.).
109. Jonathan Galtung, On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, in DILEM-
MAS OF ECONOMIC COERCION: SANCTIONS IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 7, at 17, 20
(Miroslav Nincic and Peter Wallensteen eds., 1983). Sanctions can have either or both
of the following policy objectives: a) to punish a state or states by depriving them of
certain goods, privileges, and opportunities, category A; or b) to make the targeted
state(s) comply with certain norms, category B. Id. Furthermore, sanctions can be clas-
sified as (1) inducements or punishments, (2) universal, multilateral, or unilateral, (3)
collective or targeted at an individual state, (4) internal, focused on changing the do-
mestic policy of the target, or external, emphasizing the targeted state's relations with
other states, (5) general or selective, involving all possible measures or only some, and
within that, total or partial sanctions, involving all or some of a measure. Id.
110. See THE UNITED NATIONS AND MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS, supra note 104, at 12
(presenting three categories of purposes of sanctions, notably to limit worsening of
conflict situation, as prelude or alternate to military intervention, and to change na-
tion's regime). See also MALLOY, supra note 108, at 20 (distinguishing between directive,
defensive, and communicative policy objectives).
111. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 103, at 39.
112. See id. at 40 (giving partial listing of political and economic variables). Polit-
ical variables include companion policies such as covert operations, quasi military ac-
tion, regular military action used by sender country, extent of international coopera-
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exist to assess the effectiveness of sanctions."13 Different ap-
proaches also exist to estimate the cost of sanctions.'
1 4
2. U.N. Power to Impose Sanctions
The United Nations coordinates and monitors multina-
tional collective sanctions."1 5 To this end, it has created an infra-
structure to implement sanctions. 16 Economic sanctions and
other non-military sanctions are a form of intervention within
international law.' 17
Pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, sanctions con-
stitute legitimate interventions'18 under norms of international
law when used by the United Nations to enforce international
tion in imposing sanctions, presence of international assistance to the target country,
political stability and economic health of the target country, warmth of relations be-
tween sender and target. Id. Economic variables include cost imposed on target, com-
mercial relations between sender and target state, relative economic size of the coun-
tries as measured by ratio of GNPs, types of sanctions used, cost to sender country. Id.
113. See MALLOY, supra note 108, at 626 (arguing that overarching policy used to
implement sanctions, and not sanctions themselves should be used to judge sanctions'
effectiveness); see also ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 103, at 42 (stat-
ing that success of sanctions episode is based on (1) extent to which policy outcome
sought by sender country was achieved and (2) contribution made by sanctions to a
positive outcome).
114. See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 103, at 120 (creating sep-
arate mechanism to evaluate costs of sanctions relative to sender's and target's gross
national product). There are also four broad categories of costs to the sender country
that are applicable to any sanctions episode notably a net gain to the sender, usually in
the case where aid is withheld, little effect on sender, modest loss to sender, and a
major loss to sender. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 103, at 48.
115. See U.N. CHARTER art. 41, supra note 21 (stating that U.N. Security Council
may call on U.N. Member States to apply sanctions).
116. James C. Ngobi, supra note 25, at 20-22.
117. Ernst B. Haas, Beware the Slippery Slope: Notes toward the Definition of Justifiable
Intervention, in EMERGING NORMS OFJUSTIFIED INTERVENTION 63, 66-67 (Laura W. Reed &
Carl Kaysen eds., 1993) [hereinafter JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION].
118. Lori F. Damrosch, Changing Conceptions of Intervention in International Law, in
JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION, supra note 117, at 91, 91 (giving classic definition of interven-
tion as "improper interference by an outside power with the territorial integrity or inde-
pendence of a state"). Intervention has also been defined as a less coercive form of
conflict resolution, implying the use of a collective or supranational effort such as
peacekeeping or peacemaking. See id. (stating that "intervening party comes between
disputing parties much as a mediator would but equipped with sufficient power to im-
pose ajust solution," also known as "benevolent intervention"); see also Haas, supra note
117, at 77 (describing justifiable intervention and arguing that some intervention is
"justifiable when the evil we seek to avert is overwhelming: genocide, famine, economic
disaster. In other instances, the evil is more subtle but the available means of interven-
tion are efficacious and on balance, defensible: protecting selected human rights, im-
proving economic performance, or limiting terrorism by others").
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peace and security.119 Collective enforcement action can be
taken under the U.N. Charter when there is a breach of the
peace, an act of aggression, or a threat to the peace. 120 The Se-
curity Council's authority to enforce derives from Article 39 of
the U.N. Charter. 121 Even though Article 2(7)122 limits the
power of the United Nations to intervene as an organization in
the internal affairs of a state,1 23 Article 2(7) is expressly
119. U.N. CHARTER Chapter VII, supra note 23; U.N. CHARTER art. 41, supra note
21. The legal basis for collective intervention rests in Article 1(1) of the U.N. Charter.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1. Article 1 (1) states that the purposes of the United Nations are:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,
and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles
ofjustice and international law, adjustment or settlements of international dis-
putes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
Id.
120. Id. In its advisory opinion in the Certain Expenses case, the ICJ considered
enforcement action to be that action provided for under Chapter VII of the U.N. Char-
ter. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (20July) [hereinafter Cer-
tain Expenses]. The ICJ held that the peacekeeping operation known as the U.N.
Emergency Force in Gaza ("UNEF"), did not constitute enforcement action because
the parties involved had given their consent. See id. at 170 (holding that "[tihe verb
'secure' as applied to such matters as halting the movement of military forces and arms
into the area and the conclusion of a cease-fire, might suggest measures of enforce-
ment, were it not that the Force was to be set up with the consent of the nations con-
cerned").
121. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. Article 39 of the U.N. Charter declares "[t]he Security
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore internaitonal
peace and security." Id. The Certain Expenses case clearly established that the author-
ity to enforce is vested in the Security Council and not in the General Assembly. Cer-
tain Expenses, supra note 120, at 163.
122. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7. Article 2(7) states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the applica-
tion of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Id.
123. See Damrosch, Changing Conceptions of Intervention in International Law, supra
note 118, at 96 (arguing that:
A 'group of States' acting within the framework of the UN would not be able
to go beyond the strictures of Article 2(7), and a group purporting to act
under the auspices of a regional arrangement would likewise have no greater
powers than the Security Council acting in its enforcement capacity, and
would presumably need to obtain the Council's authorization, which itself
would be confined to what is consistent with Article 2(7)).
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subordinated to the Security Council's enforcement power in sit-
uations which the Council considers as threats to international
peace and security under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 12 4
Moreover, the definition of a threat to international peace and
security is fluid and has evolved rapidly, thereby allowing the
United Nations to intervene in affairs traditionally thought to be
domestic.1 25  Individual Member States' ability to intervene
under the United Nations is regulated by Articles 1(2),126
2(4),127 and, in instances of self-defense, by Article 51.128 The
124. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7), supra note 122. Damrosch, Changing Conceptions of
Intervention in International Law, supra note 118, at 100.
125. See Damrosch, Changing Conceptions of Intervention in International Law, supra
note 118, at 103-6 (setting out cases of international intervention in Iraq for its treat-
ment of Kurds, in Yugoslavia to try and stem civil conflict, and in Somalia to stop civil
war); see also Robert A. Pastor, Forward to the Beginning: Widening the Scope for Global Collec-
tive Action, in JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION, supra note 117, at 138, 140 (arguing that new
concepts such as environment, human rights, social justice, and economic development
need to be included into traditional definition of security because those types of inju-
ries can eventually become threats to international peace and security). Boundaries
blur between what constitutes a domestic affair and what constitutes an international
threat. See AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10, 17 (conceding that "the time of
absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed"). Furthermore, a threat eventually ends
up being defined by political interests or the media. See Richard Rosencrance, Commen-
tary to Robert A. Pastor, in JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION, supra note 117, at 149, 149 (arguing
that "CNN has certainly enlarged the agenda for intervention, no matter what re-
sponses are made to increasingly visible global crises. Some intervention will be forced
on us by the sheer great degree of attention to what is actually happening.. ."). Aca-
demics have argued that consent by the target's government would override the Article
2(7) prohibition against intervention. See Kimberley Stanton, Pitfalls of Intervention: Sov-
ereignty as a Foundation for Human Rights, HARv. INT'L REV., Fall 1993, at 14, 14 (stating
that foreign presence with consent of host state should be distinguished from interven-
tion). But see Abraham Chayes, Commentary to Ernst B. Haas, in JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION,
supra note 117, at 88, 88 (arguing that consent is highly elastic and therefore dubious
concept and does not automatically ensure legitimacy, since intervened-upon party may
have to concede in many cases). Finally, a question arises regarding disintegrating
states such as Somalia, as to who gives the consent to an international or regional organ-
ization to intervene, and from where that consenting party derives its legitimacy. See id.
(questioning whether or not Somalia could consent in any effective sense).
126. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 2, supra note 37.
127. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4. Article 2(4) states that "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations." Id.
128. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Article 51 proclaims that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Se-
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intent and purpose of the intervening state, authorization by the
United Nations Security Council, or eventually commitments
laid out in a specific treaty12 9 determine the legality of unilateral
intervention by a given state.13 0
Two final options remain with the Security Council to en-
force international peace and security. 131  Under Article
36(3),132 the Security Council can encourage parties to refer
legal disputes to the International Court of Justice.13 3 Pursuant
to Article 94 of the Charter, Member States parties to the dispute
should comply with the ICJ's decision.1 34 The Security Council's
second option is to use regional or collective arrangements for
enforcement action under the Council's authority, pursuant to
Article 53 of the Charter.1 35
curity Council and shall not in any way affect the authority of and responsibil-
ity of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security."
Id.
129. Acevado, supra note 98, at 328.
130. See id. at 323-24 (analyzing U.S. sanctions against Argentina resulting from
Malvinas conflict).
131. See U.N. CHARTER art. 36, 3, art. 53 (outlining options available to Security
Council to settle disputes such as, referring disputes to ICJ and using regional arrange-
ments).
132. U.N. CHARTER art. 36, 3. Article 36(3) states that "[iun making recommen-
dations under this Article the Security Ciuncil should also take into consideration that
legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International
Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court." Id.
133. Id. See U.N. CHARTER art. 37(2) (declaring that "[i]f the Security Council
deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article
36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.").
134. U.N. CHARTER art. 94. Article 94 states that:
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the deci-,
sion of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it
under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse
to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommenda-
tions or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
Id.
135. U.N. CHARTER art. 53. Article 53 states:
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional ar-
rangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by re-
gional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the
exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of
this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements
directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state,
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3. Multinational Organizations' Mechanisms to
Impose Sanctions
The imposition of sanctions involves implementation and
maintenance policies.13 6  Depending on the type of sanction,
unilateral or multilateral, the implementation of the sanctions
and the policies followed will vary.1 3 7 Multinational organiza-
tions such as the United Nations have set up extensive mecha-
nisms to initiate, administer, and oversee a sanctions episode. 131
Ultimately, however, the Member States of the multinational or-
ganization are responsible for implementing the measures
through national enforcement and compliance.1 39
a. The OAS
Since the early 1990s, the United Nations has increased its
cooperation with regional organizations such as the OAS."4
Furthermore, in response to a wave of democratization in Latin
until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments con-
cerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by
such a state.
2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to
any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signa-
tory of the present Charter.
Id.
136. LoPEz & CORTRIGHT, supra note 26, at 3.
137. See Christopher C. Joyner, Sanctions and International Law, in ECONOMIC SANC-
TIONS: PANACEA OR PEACEBUILDING, supra note 25, at 73, 79 (stating that there are inher-
ent differences among nations' national legislation, individual legislative processes, and
bureaucratic capabilities to implement sanctions).
138. See id. at 76 (outlining basic U.N. sanctions mechanism).
139. Id. at 77.
140. AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10, 1 63. The author writes:
In the past, regional arrangements often were created because of the absence
of a universal system for collective security; thus their activities could on occa-
sion work at cross-purposes with the sense of solidarity required for the effec-
tiveness of the world Organization. But in this new era of opportunity, re-
gional arrangements or agencies can render great service if their activities are
undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the
Charter, and if their relationship with the United Nations, and particularly the
Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII.
... Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to
have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,
but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and coopera-
tion with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the
Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and
democratization in international affairs.
Id. at 63, 64.
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America in the 1980s,141 the OAS adopted a resolution to com-
bat future threats to democracy in the region. 142 The OAS Gen-
eral Assembly adopted Resolution 1080 (the "Santiago Declara-
tion") in June 1991.143 The Santiago Declaration established a
new mechanism for convening an Ad Hoc Meeting of the Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs, or a special session of the OAS General
Assembly, in response to any coup d'ltat which overthrew a demo-
cratically elected leader in one of the OAS Member States.14
4
The Ministers could then study the situation and propose meth-
ods to rectify the problem. 145 The proposal could include sanc-
tions or some other form of intervention in the situation. 46
141. See RichardJ. Bloomfield, Making the Western Hemisphere SafeforDemocracy? The
OAS Defense-of-Democracy Regime, 17 WASH. Q. 2 157, 161 (1994) (stating that emergence
of democracies in Latin America in 1980s resulted from dictatorships' inabilities to deal
with problems facing Latin American societies).
142. Id. The OAS Charter also includes, as its second objective, the promotion
and consolidation of democracy, the first objective being the strengthening of peace
and security in the region. OAS CHARTER, supra note 30, art. 2.
The Organization of American States, in order to put into practice the princi-
ples on which it is founded and to fulfill its regional obligations under the
Charter of the United Nations, proclaims the following essential purposes:
a) To strengthen the peace and security of the continent;
b) To promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect
for the principle of non-intervention....
Id. art. 2, a, b.
143. OAS G.A. Res. 1080 (1991), OAS Doc. AG/RES 1080 (XXI-0/91) [hereinaf-
ter The Santiago Declaration].
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Bloomfield, supra note 141, at 158 (stating that in coups following adop-
tion of Santiago Declaration, OAS foreign ministers resorted to economic and political
sanctions to back up their demands that democracy be restored). Shortly after resolu-
tion's adoption, the OAS' commitment to democracy under the Santiago Declaration
was put to the test with coups in Peru, Guatemala and Haiti. Id. Since the Santiago
Declaration, the OAS has not only condemned the political coups in Haiti, Peru, and
Guatemala in 1991 and 1992 but also, in the case of Haiti, backed its condemnations
with economic and political sanctions. Id. Giving the reasons, for instance, why the
OAS needed to intervene in the Haitian situation how and when it did, Assistant Secre-
tary of State, Bernard Aronson testified to the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Affairs on October 31, 1991 that:
The international community has a deep interest in defending the December
elections because its presence in Haiti helped to guarantee that the process
could, and did, succeed. We have a responsibility also because the unanimous
decision in Santiago to defend democracy is being tested and watched by
others throughout this Hemisphere who might harbor similar designs. Finally
we have an obligation to act because after 200 years of waiting, the Haitian
people need and deserve the solidarity of the democratic community to de-
fend their hard-won, fragile, and new democratic liberties.
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While the Santiago Declaration initiated the OAS' current pro-
gram for hemisphere-wide democracy, 14 7 the Declaration only
conditions, rather than repeal the OAS' principle of non-inter-
vention stated in Article 18 of the OAS Charter. 1 4  Enforcement
activities of the OAS also remain under Security Council control
pursuant to Article 53(1) of the U.N. Charter, because regional
arrangements cannot pursue enforcement action without the ap-
proval of the United Nations. 149
b. The United Nations
The General Assembly can only issue non-binding recom-
mendations and its enforcement power is therefore limited. 5
Pursuant to Article 14 of the U.N. Charter, the General Assembly
may recommend that Member States voluntarily impose sanc-
Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Bernard Aronson Before the
Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Aff. Comm. (1991).
147. Bloomfield, supra note 141, at 158. Prior to the Santiago Declaration, the
OAS tended to ignore its mandate to promote democracy in favor of its requirement of
nonintervention. Id. Resolution 1080 reflected primarily the interests of the United
States, Venezuela and Chile and represented an attempt to bring democracy to the fore
of the OAS' agenda for the 1990s. Id. at 161-62. See id. at 169 n. 6 (pointing out that
Resolution 1080 was compromise). The Caribbean nations, Argentina, Canada and a
few other states quickly accepted the provisions set forth by the Resolution. Id. at 162.
Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and a few others on the other hand had some reservations
about the Resolution, particularly that the Resolution seemed so automatic in its imple-
mentation. Id. When the OAS was considering referring the Haiti issue to the Security
Council, Brazil did not want to on the grounds that Haiti did not constitute a threat to
international peace and security and therefore no action should be taken under Chap-
ter VII of the U.N. Charter. Id. at 164.
148. OAS CHARTER art. 18, supra note 99. Bloomfield, supra note 141, at 162.
Commentators have argued that the principle of nonintervention enshrined in the
OAS Charter is at the root of the structural obstacles to a strong OAS defense-of-democ-
racy regime. Id.
149. U.N. CHARTER, art. 53, 1 1, supra note 135. See Edem Kodjo, Article 53, in LA
CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES, supra note 41, at 817-831 (discussing interaction between
U.N. Security Council and regional arrangements pursuant to U.N. Charter).
150. U.N. CHARTER arts. 10-14. See U.N. CHARTER art. 25 (requiring Member States
only to carry out Security Council decisions and not General Assembly resolutions). If
adopted unanimously, the General Assembly resolutions are nothing more than evi-
dence of the law or of political will. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM.J. INT'L
L. 1, 3 (1994). The General Assembly functions independently of the Security Council
but cannot proceed on any issue which is being considered by the Security Council.
U.N. CHARTER art. 12, 1 1. "While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any
dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General
Assembly shall not make any recommendations with regard to that dispute or situation
unless the Security Council so requests." Id.
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tions.1 51 In contrast, the Security Council plays a central role in
the creation of mandatory sanctions imposed by the United Na-
tions.15
2
Article 41 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter Constitutes the
legal basis for the imposition of compulsory sanctions. 153 For Ar-
ticle 41 to take effect, the Security Council must first determine
under Article 39 that the situation threatens international peace
and security. 15 4 The determination of the threat is left to the
discretion of the Security Council.'55 The Security Council may
also apply Article 41 to a state that has not violated international
law, if the Council finds it necessary to do so to enforce one of its
decisions for the sake of maintaining international peace and
security. 156
Article 50 of the U.N. Charter provides for a possible ex-
emption from participating in a given enforcement action for
151. U.N. CHARTER art. 14. Examples of voluntary sanctions recommended by the
U.N. General Assembly include an arms embargo against Bulgaria and Greece in 1949,
against China in 1951, and a comprehensive embargo against South Africa. ROBERT B.
LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 469
(2nd ed. 1991). The South Africa embargo recommended by the General Assembly
went largely ignored for its first fifteen years by South Africa's main trading parmers,
including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Switzer-
land. Id.
152. Schachter, supra note 150, at 12.
153. U.N. CHARTER art. 41, supra note 21. Schachter, supra note 150, at 12.
154. U.N. CHARTER art. 39, supra note 121.
155. The United Nations, 13 Whiteman DIGEST § 4, at 415-416. The United States'
report on the San Francisco Conference, stated with respect to Article 39 that:
If any single provision of the Charter has more substance than the others, it is
surely this one sentence, in which are concentrated the most important pow-
ers of the Security Council. It leaves a wide latitude to the discretion of the
Security Council, which decides whether a threat to the peace... exists....
Id. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (April 14)
(holding that once Security Council takes Chapter VII action, its decision is essentially
unreviewable). See also Certain Expenses, supra note 120, at 168 (stating in dictum that
[t] he primary place ascribed [by the U.N. Charter] to international peace and
security is natural, since the fulfilment of the other purposes will be depen-
dent upon the attainment of that basic condition. These purposes are broad
indeed, but neither they nor the powers conferred to effectuate them are un-
limited. Save as they have entrusted the Organization with the attainment of
these common ends, the Member States retain their freedom of action. But
when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was
appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United
Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organiza-
tion.).
156. Schachter, supra note 150, at 12.
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sender states.15 7 Article 50, however, is not an escape clause for
Member States.' 58 Article 50 applies to any state, except the
targeted state, suffering economic difficulties as a result of the
preventive or enforcement measures. 159 But Article 50 does not
guarantee that those states seeking an exemption will receive
assistance 160 and only mentions that the state may consult with
the Security Council to find a solution to its problems. 16'
Although the responsibility for implementing the sanctions
established by the Security Council lies with the Member
States,1 62 the United Nations can also monitor which measures
sender countries are taking to meet their obligations. 6 3 The Se-
curity Council resolution establishing the sanctions provides a
deadline by which states must report on the measures they have
taken.' 64 In addition, the Security Council's resolution calls for
the creation of a sanctions committee to monitor the implemen-
tation of the sanctions. 65 Finally, U.N. Member States' obliga-
tion to pass domestic legislation to implement a Security Council
sanctions resolution is set out under Article 25 of the U.N. Char-
157. U.N. CHARTER art. 50. Article 50 states:
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Se-
curity Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or
not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising
from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the
Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.
Id.
158. VERA GOWLLAND-DEBBAS, COLLECrIVE RESPONSES TO ILLEGAL ACTS IN INTERNA.
TIONAL LAw: UNITED NATIONS AcTION IN THE QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA 500
(1990). While the unequal burden of applying sanctions is a political and economic
one, the Charter only explicitly provides legal remedies which "lie either in a dispensa-
tion for certain States by the Security Council on the basis, presumably, of Article 48(1),
or in the provision of particular financial or technical assistance under Article 50 and
Article 49." Id.
159. Pierre Michel Eisemann, Article 50, in LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES, supra
note 41, at 762, 762.
160. Id.
161. U.N. CHARTER art. 50, supra note 157.
162. Joyner, supra note 137, at 77.
163. Ngobi, supra note 25, at 21-22.
164. See id. at 22 (mentioning reports Member States submit reports to Security
Council regarding implementation measures); see, e.g., Note du Secritaire Gniral au Con-
seil de Sicuriti, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/26173, S/26173/Add.1, S/26173/Add.2
(1993), reprinted in LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 313 (discussing and
listing receipt by Secretary General of Member States' reports pursuant to paragraph 13
of Resolution 841 concerning sanctions in Haiti).
165. Ngobi, supra note 25, at 22.
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ter. 'I Under Article 48(2) of the Charter, Member States must
also ensure that the Specialized Agencies carry out the the Sanc-
tions Committee's decisions as well. 1
67
C. U.N. Sanctions in Haiti
The United Nations imposed sanctions on Haiti as a result
of the October 1991 overthrow of Haitian President Jean-Ber-
trand Aristide 1 6s The U.N. sanctions followed several attempts
by the international community to reinstate President Aris-
tide. 69 The U.N. sanctions exacerbated a number of social, eco-
nomic, and political problems endemic to Haiti. 170
166. U.N. CHARTER art. 25. "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter." Id. Each Member State will have its own means for implementing sanctions.
Joyner, supra note 137, at 77. Four acts provide the legislative basis for the U.S. govern-
ment to implement sanctions called for by the United Nations, notably the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), the National Emergency Act
("NEA"), the U.N. Participation Act, and the Trading with the Enemy Act. Id. The
1EEPA gives the President the broad authority over financial transactions and property
in which any foreign country or national has any interest, if a situation exists which
threatens American national interests. 50 U.S.C. § 1701-1706 (1982); see MALLOY, supra
note 108, at 159-73 (discussing legislative history, principal provisions, and current uses
of IEEPA). To invoke the Presidential powers under the IEEPA, a national emergency
must be declared through the issuance of an executive order pursuant to the NEA. 50
U.S.C. § 1601-1651;Joyner, supra note 137, at 78. The U.N. Participation Act authorizes
the President to apply economic and other sanctions against a target country or a na-
tional thereof in accordance with any mandatory decision by the Security Council
under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. 22 U.S.C. 287-287(e) (1945); see MALLOY, supra
note 108, at 148-59 (outlining legislative history, principal provisions, and current uses
of U.N. Participation Act). The Trading with the Enemy Act is another statute that can
be used to regulate economic relations but it can only be used after Congress has issued
a formal declaration of war. 50 U.S.C. app. §6(b) (1982); see MALLOY, supra note 108, at
136-48 (outlining legislative history, principal provisions, and current uses of Trading
with the Enemy Act).
167. U.N. CHARTER art. 48, 1 2. Article 48 states:
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for
the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all
the Members of the United Nations or by some of them as the Security
Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations
directly and through their action in the appropriate international agen-
cies of which they are members.
U.N. CHARTER art. 48.
168. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 2.
169. Id.
170. LEs NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 4-5.
U.N. SANCTIONS IN HAITI
1. Haiti Prior to 1991
By 1991, Haiti was the poorest nation in the Western hemi-
sphere. 171 Sixty-five percent of Haitian adults were illiterate, 1
72
Haitian GDP per capita was less than US$300,173 and the top
four percent of Haitian households controlled sixty-six percent
of the resources. 174 Haiti, however, had once been the crown-
jewel in the French empire. 175 Fifty percent of France's transat-
lantic trade had involved Haiti and nearly twenty percent of the
French population depended on trade with Haiti for its liveli-
hood.176 By the end of the eighteenth century, the colony of
Saint Domingue, modern-day Haiti, nearly outproduced all the
French and English Carribean colonies put together.
177
The roots of Haiti's socio-economic and political crises de-
rive from Haiti's first days as a colony. 178 The Spanish first intro-
duced African slaves to Santo Domingo in 1501.179 It was not
until Santo Domingo became a French colony in 1697 that there
was pervasive use of African slavery to support the growing to-
bacco, indigo, cacao, and especially sugar industries.180 The
sugar plantations led to the consolidation of lands in the hands
of large landowners and gave rise to a class structure that re-
flected the hierarchy of race and color that slavery engen-
dered. 8' A series of slave revolts beginning in 1679 eventually
led to the independence of Haiti from France in 1804.182
Immediately following its independence, Haiti began its tur-
bulent relationship with the Western powers. 8 ' The United
States, France, and other European powers refused to recognize
the sovereignty of Haiti, thereby isolating Haiti politically and
171. USAID, HAITI: MONITORING REPORT NOVEMBER 1993, at 15.
172. Id. at endleaf.
173. Id. at 15.
174. Secr&airerie d'Etat de la Population d'Haiti, Symposium National sur la Popula-
tion et le Deloppement Humain, July 1995, at 11 [hereinafter Symposium National].
175. BELLEGARDE-SMITH, supra note 6, at xviii.
176. Id.
177. DupuV, supra note 6, at 21.
178. See Mintz, supra note 6, at 73 (stating that Haiti's crisis is historical one).
179. BELLEGARDE-SMITH, supra note 6, at 32.
180. Dupuy, supra note 6, at 20.
181. See id. at 24-50 (oudining class divisions among Haitian society of late seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries).
182. Id. at 34; BELLEGARDE-SMITH, supra note 6, at 41-42.
183. Id. at 94-95. See Mintz, supra note 6, at 74 (observing that Western powers
never forgave Haiti for its revolution).
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economically.' 84 In exchange for recognizing Haiti, France re-
quested 150 million French Francs and various trade concessions
from the new Haitian government. 185 France received approxi-
mately half of Haiti's exports in the nineteenth century and
made large loans to the Haitian Government to pay the indemni-.
ties of former slave owners.1 8 6
By 1903, France's influence had waned, the United States
controlled sixty percent of Haiti's imports, and German interests
controlled the wholesale sector.'8 7 During the second half of
the nineteenth century, the United States intervened nineteen
times in Haiti on behalf of American business interests 188 and
sought to gain control through an unsuccessful bid for a military
base. 89 Intervention by the United States culminated in the in-
vasion of 1915 and the ensuing U.S. occupation until 1934 by the
U.S. marines.1 90
Haiti had won its independence but inherited a shattered
economy destroyed by the war. 91 The temporary nationalism
that had helped Haiti win its independence defined itself along
racial rather than political lines. 9 The sharp social and cul-
tural divisions emanating from the plantation culture in Haiti's
colonial days, resurfaced shortly after Haiti's independence and
the unifying nationalism disappeared. 9
Class divisions emerged, with a French-speaking black and
mulatto elite, identifying with French culture and the plantation
system of production for export, opposed by a Kreyol-speaking
peasant laborer class seeking to protect itself from being turned
into another slave work force. 194 Cultural differences sharply re-
flected the social divisions. 9 The social divisions and each
184. Dupuv, supra note 6, at 93-94.
185. Id.
186. BELLEGARDE-SMITH, supra note 6, at 54.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 54.
189. Id.
190. See Dupuv, supra note 6, at 131-42 (discussing reasons for and consequences
of U.S. invasion in 1915).
191. Id. at 74.
192. Id. at 82.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 83.
195. BELLEGARDE-SMITH, supra note 6, at 12-52. The French-speaking westernized
elite observed Catholicism and eventually protestantism, whereas the Kreyol-speaking
peasantry adhered to Voodoo, a religion brought over from Africa by the slaves. Id.
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class' attempts to achieve its goals shaped Haiti's social, political,
and economic structures throughout the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries.196 By the middle of the twentieth century, the
elite remained divided between a subordinate black bourgoisie
and a dominant mulatto bourgeoisie. 197
From an economic standpoint, Haiti remains agriculturally
based.1 98 In the 1970s and 1980s Haiti expanded into the ex-
ports of assembled goods. 9 9 Haiti, however, has yet to create a
domestic basis for the accumulation of capital. °0° The Haitian
economy's current underdevelopment is due to the lack of mod-
ernization of the agricultural sector and to the assembly sector
being dominated by foreign investors who repatriated the bulk
of the profits. 20 1 The United States represents Haiti's main ex-
port market, with nearly three-quarters of Haiti's exports, ex-
cluding manufactured products, ending up in the United States
in 1987 and in 1992.02 Moreover, Haiti has one of the lowest
per head energy consumption figures in the world. 20 3
Haiti and the Vatican negotiated the Concordat of 1860 in an attempt by the Haitian
elite to gain recognition. Id. at 52. The Agreement consolidated the Roman Catholic
Church in Haiti, promoted western education, and strengthened the persecution of
Voodoo. Id.
196. Dupuy, supra note 6, at 82-83.
.197. Id. at 152-57.
198. Symposium National, supra note 174, at 9. An estimated two-thirds of the Hai-
tian work force works in the agricultural sector. Id. The agricultural sector, however,
has a low output and only thrity-one percent of GDP. Id.
199. DuPuy, supra note 6, at 175. The United States spearheaded the Caribbean
Basin Initiative ("CBI") in 1981 to help establish an assembly and manufacturing indus-
try in the Caribbean for export. Id. at 174. Dupuy argues that CBI exacerbated rather
than alleviated Haiti's poverty because the bulk of the profits were repatriated and it
failed to generate the growth of locally owned import-substitution industries in Haiti.
Id. at 175. The number of assembly enterprises in Haiti grew from 13 companies in
1966, to 127 in 1978, reaching a peak of 200 firms employing sixty thousand workers.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI: COUNTRY STUDIES 303 (Richard A. Haggerty ed., 2nd
ed. 1991). Political instability coupled with the CBI, and the ensuing increase in re-
gional competition, prompted a number of firms to move to Mexico and to the Domini-
can Republic. Id. Approximately twelve thousand jobs were lost as a result of the over-
throw of Baby Doc Duvalier. BELLEGARDE-SM1TH, supra note 6, at 120.
200. DuPuY, supra note 6, 180.
201. Id. at 179.
202. Economist Intelligence Unit, COUNTRY PROFILE: HAITI 1994-1995, at 46.
203. See World Bank. Social Indicators of Development, 1993 246 (1993) (estimating
per head energy consumption in Haiti at 49 kg of oil equivalent per year in 1991). In
1994 Haiti's oil requirements amounted to about 6,000 barrels per day. ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY PROFILE: HAITI 1993/94. In fiscal year 1990/91 fuel im-
ports totalled $68.6 million, 15% of total merchandise imports. Id.
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Politically, the increasingly fragmented Haitian elite214 saw
the State as the best way to serve the interests of their group. 0 5
Despite attempts to create a constitutional governmental frame-
work,2 0 6 coups d'etat and political uprisings became the most
common means of installing governments and removing them
from power.20 7 The army came to play a central role in the polit-
ical process.20 8 Occasional dictatorships interrupted a long line
of brief presidencies throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. 209 The father-son dictatorship of Francois "Papa Doc"
and Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier lasting from 1957 to 1986
was one of the longest and most repressive of Haitian dictator-
ships.210
The political influence of the Catholic Church increased
204. Dupuy, supra note 6, at 99. The Haitian elite consisted of two groups, with a
dominant segment of urban residents, rural landed bourgeoisie, holders of state powers
and high government functionaries, the high Catholic clergy, financial and commercial
bourgeoisie, and a subordinate group of lawyers, judges, high-ranking miltary officers,
doctors, academics, and members of the clergy. Id.
205. Id. at 117.
206. BELLEGARDE-SMITH, supra note 6, at 133. Haiti has had two dozen constitu-
tions between 1801 and 1987. Id. at 133-34. The various constitutions led to a Kreyol
expression summing up Haitian politics that Konstitisyon sipapid, bayonet sift, the Consti-
tution is made of paper, bayonets are made of steel. Id. at 133. The 1987 constitution
divides the power of the executive branch between an elected President and a Prime
Minister, in an attempt to avoid the return of more dictatorships. Id. at 135. The Con-
stitution emanated from the upper and middle-classes and the Constitution's major.
provisions came about as a result of intensive lobbying by peasant groups. Id. at 135-39.
For the first time, Kreyol became an official language, in addition to French, even
though only ten percent of Haitians speak French. Id. at 137. The repeal of a 1935
decree decriminalized Voodoo, which the majority of Haitians practice. Id. The 1987
Constitution was briefly abolished in 1988 during a coup d'etat and reinstated in 1989
during another one. Id. at 138.
207. Dupuy, supra note 6, at 117-19.
208. Id.
209. See Douglas Farah, A First in Haiti: Democratic Succession, WASH. POST, Feb. 8,
1996, at Al (discussing Haiti's governments). See also Ken Ringle, The Haunted Land:
Haiti's History Has Been Scrawled in Blood, but its People and Art are Etched with Life, WASH.
POST, Oct. 13, 1994, at DI (reporting on Haitian coups and dictatorships).
210. BELLEGARDE-SMITH, supra note 6, at 97-108. In 1964, Papa Doc Duvalier
drafted a new constitution and declared himself President for Life. Dupuy, supra note
6, at 161. Twenty to fifty thousand Haitians are estimated to have been killed during
the Duvalier dictatorship. BELLEGARDE-SMITH, supra note 6, at 97. By the mid-1960s,
eighty percent of Haiti's professionals had fled. Id. Paia Doc persecuted the Catholic
Church while donating actively to Protestant missions, in an attempt to undermine the
power of the Catholic Church in Haiti. Id. at 102-3. The Duvaliers did not undertake
any projects to improve the Haitian economy and the plight of most Haitians worsened
under Baby Doc Duvalier, in power from 1971 to 1986. Id. at 104.
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over time, particularly during the repression of the Duvalier re-
gime. 11 In the 1980s, the Catholic Church started the Ti Leglize
movement.2 12 Although initially viewed by the majority of Hai-
tians as an elitist imposter because of its upper-class followers, its
pro-Western ideology, and its prior support of the status quo, the
Catholic Church became one of the few organized fora in the
1980s for dissidence.213
2. Haiti from 1991-1994
Following the overthrow of President Aristide, the OAS and
the United Nations undertook a series of measures ranging from
statements condemning the coup21 4 to a military intervention
that restored President Aristide to power in 1994.215 The longest
lasting measures consisted of economic sanctions imposed by
the OAS and eventually by the United Nations.2 16 The economic
sanctions had a wide-ranging impact on the majority of the Hai-
tian population. 217
a. Coup d'Etat
The Duvalier dictatorship ended in February 1986, when
Baby Doc Duvalier fled with his wife to France aboard a U.S.
military plane.2 18 A succession of military governments assumed
power from 1986 to 1990219 and the new 1987 Constitution came
into being.220 In March 1990, the then-provisional government
requested electoral assistance from the United Nations to elect a
Haitian President.221 Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former Catholic
211. BELLEGARDE-SMITH, supra note 6, at 151. See supra note 210 (discussing perse-
cution of Catholic Church by Duvaliers).
212. BELLEGARDE-SMITH, supra note 6, at 102-103. Consisting of 500 base commu-
nities, the Ti Leglize movement provided an organizational framework to combat pov-
erty and to allow peasants to challenge the system and demand change. Id.
213. Id. at 151.
214. Supra note 14 and accompanying text.
215. Supra note 19 and accompanying text.
216. LEs NATIONS UNIES ET HATI, supra note 4, at 4 (observing that for nearly
three years OAS and United Nations tried to resolve Haiti's crisis by using sanctions and
negotiations).
217. Id. at 5.
218. Thomas W. Lippman, Haiti's Tortured History Provided Little on Which to "Re-
build", WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1994, at A19.
219. See LEs NATIONS UNIES ET HAITi, supra note 4, at 9 (outlining four military
coups following ousting of Duvalier).
220. Lippman, supra note 218, A19.
221. Electoral Assistance, supra note 13, at 2.
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priest,222 advocating social and economic reform policies, won
the December 1990 election and was inaugurated in February
1991.223 Aristide quickly implemented a series of social welfare
and agrarian reform policies,224 threatening to reduce the polit-
ical and economic power of the elite and of the military. 25 In
September of 1991, a military triumvirate headed by the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Haitian army appointed by Aristide,
Raoul C(dras, overthrew Arisitide with the support and the fi-
nancial backing of the Haitian elite. 2 6
b. Initial International Response
The Permanent Council of the OAS immediately issued Res-
olution 567 following the military's overthrow of Aristide. 2 27
Resolution 567 condemned the coup, demanded that the mili-
tary restore Aristide to office, and convened an Ad Hoc Meeting
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs pursuant to the Santiago Declara-
tion.22 18 The Ad Hoc Meeting took place at the beginning of Oc-
tober 1991 and the OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs, following a
speech given by Aristide, adopted the first of four resolutions
further condemning the coup, recognizing Aristide's govern-
ment as the legitimate government. 229 The resolution also rec-
ommended that states isolate the military regime diplomatically,
222. AMY WILENTZ, THE RAmNY SEASON 126-128 (1989). Aristide had previously
been a priest in the Salesian order in Port-au-Prince, working with poor urban slum
dwellers, especially in Citi Soleil, one of Haiti's worst slums. Id. The Salesians kicked
Aristide out of the order in 1988 for having advocated class struggle. Id. Aristide went
on to join the ranks of the proactive priests who would come to form the Ti Legliz
movement. Id.; see supra note 212 and accompanying text (describing origins and role
of Ti Legliz in Haiti).
223. Lippman, supra note 218, A19.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. See Rick Bragg, Haiti's Light-Skinned Elite: The Tiny Minority Behind Aristide's
Ouster, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994, at 14 (reporting on Haitian elite and its support of
Aristide's overthrow).
227. OAS Res. 567, in FOREIGN POL'Y BULL. 61 (Nov./Dec. 1991).
228. Id.
229. MRE/Res 1/91, supra note 14. The Resolution stated that the Ad Hoc Meet-
ing of Ministers of Foreign Affairs resolved:
3. To recognize the representatives designated by the constitutional Govern-
ment of PresidentJean-Bertrand Aristide as the only legitimate representa-
tives of the Government of Haiti to the organs, agencies, and entities of
the Inter-American system.
4. To urge the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in response to
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's request, to take immediately all meas-
1997] U.N. SANCTIONS IN HAITI 1913
suspend all financial, economic and commercial ties to Haiti,
and that aid to Haiti, including military, police, or security assist-
ance be suspended.2 3 0 The second resolution, adopted five days
later, reiterated the measures and expanded on the human
rights issue, setting the groundwork for an OAS civilian mission
to monitor human rights and to facilitate the reestablishment
and strengthening of democratic institutions. 23 ' The OAS
wanted to convey to the defacto military government that there
was no alternative to a negotiated settlement.3 2 In 1992, the Ad
ures within its competence to protect and defend human rights in Haiti
and to report thereon to the Permanent Council of the Organization.
5. To recommend, with due respect for the policy of each member state on
the recognition of states and governments, action to bring about the dip-
lomatic isolation of those who hold power illegally in Haiti.
6. To recommend to all states that they suspend their economic, financial,
and commercial ties with Haiti and any aid and technical cooperation ex-
cept that provided for strictly humanitarian purposes.
7. To request the Secretary General of the Organization to pursue efforts to
increase the Inter-American Fund for Priority Assistance to Haiti, but to
refrain from using it so long as the present situation prevails.
8. To recommend to the General Secretariat of the Organization the suspen-
sion of all assistance to those who hold power illegally in Haiti and to
request the regional organs and institutions.. .to adopt the same measure.
9. To urge all states to provide no military, police, or security assistance of
any kind and to prevent the delivery of arms, munitions, or equipment to
that country in any manner, public or private.
Id. Marc Bazin, who ran against Aristide in the 1990 elections and was briefly Prime
Minister under the defacto military government, wrote in Dhmocratie sous Pression that the
OAS' primary concern had not so much been the fate of democracy in Haiti but rather
its fate in Latin America. MARc BAZIN, D9MOCRATIE SOUS PRESSION, 174 (1995). To that
end the OAS wanted to use Haiti as an example and therefore applied the sanctions
rather hastily, anticipating that they would take effect immediately. Id. He noted, that
from that point on, the OAS could only go backwards and make concessions. Id. The
OAS did not have enough leverage to negotiate, particularly between two parties who
were not willing to negotiate. Id.
230. MRE/Res 1/91, supra note 14.
231. MRE/Res 2/91, supra note 14.
232. Id. The OAS Ministers' views gradually shifted as to what role the United
Nations should play in resolving the Haitian crisis. MRE/Res 1/91, supra note 14;
MRE/Res 2/91, supra note 14; OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs, MRE/Res 3/92
(1992); OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs, MRE Res 4/92 (1992). The first resolution
sought to notify the United Nations of the action taken by the OAS. See MRE/Res 1/91,
supra note 14 (stating in operative paragraph that Ministers had resolved "to transmit
this resolution to the United Nations and its specialized Agencies and to urge them to
consider its spirit and aims"). The second resolution sought a more active role for the
United Nations. See MRE/Res 2/91, supra note 14 (resolving "to transmit this resolu-
tion to the United Nations and to request its Member states to adopt the same measures
agreed upon by the American states"). A third resolution requested that the United
Nations help implement the measures listed in the resolution. MRE/Res 3/92, supra
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Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted two addi-
tional resolutions.
233
By nature, the OAS is a regional organization limited in its
geographic234 and legal scope.23 5 As a regional organization, the
OAS cannot resort to enforcement action without the consent of
the U.N. Security Council, nor can it use coercive means. 236 The
OAS sanctions imposed on Haiti were not mandatory and were
only partially applied by OAS member states.237 The United
States, for instance, was one member state to partially lift the
sanctions it had imposed on Haiti pursuant to the OAS Resolu-
tions. 238
c. U.N. Response
The United Nations ultimately responded to the Haitian
coup d'itat with a gamut of sanctions ranging from voluntary to
note 232. A fourth resolution called for the consideration "of the possibility and advisa-
bility of bringing the Haitian situation to the attention of the United Nations Security
Council as a means of bringing about global application of the trade embargo recom-
mended by the OAS." MRE/Res 4/92, supra note 232.
233. MRE/Res 3/92, supra note 232; MRE/Res 4/92, supra note 232.
234. OAS CHARTER, supra note 30, art. 1.
235. Id.
236. U.N. CHARTER art. 53, supra note 135.
237. LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 24.
238. See Testimony of Donna Hinack, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Carribbean and
Mexican Affairs, Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Aff. of the House Foreign Aff.
Comm., February 19, 1992 (giving reasons for lifting of embargo by United States)
[hereinafter Donna Hrinack Testimony]. By February of 1992, the United States began
stepping away from its obligation to maintain the sanctions, by lifting the constraints it
had initially imposed on American companies with assembly factories in Haiti ("807
companies"). Id.
These components and products do not enter Haitian commerce - Haiti sim-
ply provides the labor to assemble them. Our action does not open or resume
general commerce with Haiti. I want to stress that we took this action precisely
out of concern for the effect the embargo was having on poor Haitian workers
employed by these companies - or not employed, which was increasingly the
case - and on the families that depend on their wages. We, likewise, acted to
prevent what we concluded would have been disastrous and lasting damages to
the Haitian economy through the bankruptcy of the 807 companies or their
shift to third countries. At the time we imposed the embargo, we weighed very
carefully the impact it would have on the 807 sector. From firsthand experi-
ence, I can assure the Committee that we agonized for days, knowing the harm
that would come to the 40,000 employees and up to 250,000 dependents and
to the future of one of the few really bright spots of the economy. To lessen
the impact, we granted that sector a 30-day grace period during which compa-
nies could continue to ship materials and assembled goods to and from Haiti.
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mandatory selective and comprehensive measures.2 3 9 The OAS
and the United Nations applied a three-tiered system of political,
economic, and aid-related sanctions against the defacto military
government. 240 All three of the components sought to pressure
the de facto government to step down, restore democracy, and
respect human rights. 241
i. General Assembly Resolutions
Pursuant to Articles 10 and 14 of the U.N. Charter, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted a series of Resolu-
tions2 4 2 in conjunction with the various OAS Resolutions. 243 The
U.N. General Assembly adopted two types of resolutions between
October of 1991 and December of 1992.244 Interspersed among
the second set of resolutions were the Secretary-General's re-
ports written pursuant to these same resolutions, describing in
greater detail the situation in Haiti. 245 Three General Assembly
239. See HARVARD CENTER FOR POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, SANCTIONS
IN HAITI: CRISIS IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION ii (Program on Human Security Working Pa-
per Series, 1993) [hereinafter, THE REPORT] (outlining types of sanctions imposed on
Haiti).
240. Id.
241. Id..
Political sanctions sought to isolate and de-legitimize the de facto government,
mostly through diplomatic ostracism. The economic embargo aimed to crip-
ple the economy by freezing overseas financial assets and blocking interna-
tional trade. The withholding of foreign aid or the shift from development to
strictly humanitarian aid also had the purpose of punishing the de facto gov-
ernmenL
Id. The Security Council eventually added a fourth tier of communciations sanctions by
adopting Resolution 917 and banning commercial flights. S.C. Res. 917, supra note 3.
242. G.A. Res. 46/7, supra note 15; GA. Res. 47/20A, supra note 16; GA. Res. 46/
138, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 98, U.N. Doc. 46/138 (1991); GA. Res. 47/
143, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 97, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/143 reprinted in LES
NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 251-252; G.A. Res. 47/20B, supra note 15.
243. MRE Res. 1/91 supra note 14; MRE Res. 2/91 supra note 14; MRE Res. 3/92
supra note 232.
244. G.A. Res. 46/7, supra note 15; GA Res. 47/20A, supra note 16. One set of
resolutions focused on (1) promoting the use of OAS sanctions, (2) enticing to entice
the military in Haiti to step down by promising an increase in aid once the constitu-
tional government regained power, and (3) strengthening democratic institutions in
Haiti. Id. The second set discussed the violation of human rights in Haiti, called for an
increase in humanitarian assistance and focused on the issue of refugees and boat peo-
ple. GA Res. 46/138, supra note 242; GA Res. 47/143, supra note 242; G.A. Res. 47/
20B, supra note 15. Unlike the first type, these resolutions did not mention the OAS
resolutions. Id.
245. The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti: Report of the Secretary Gen-
eral, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 22, U.N. Doc. A/47/599 (1992); The Situation
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resolutions constituted the extent of the United Nations' efforts
to settle the dispute through pacific means.246
Unless the Security Council finds that a situation threatens
international peace and security, the Council is limited to find-
ing a pacific settlement to the situation and may not resort to
coercive measures under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.247
The OAS and the U.N. General Assembly resolutions paved the
way for establishing Haiti as a threat to international peace and
security, and established a framework for the adoption of Secur-
ity Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.248
By the end of 1992, the United Nations had exhausted most non-
of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., Agenda Item 22, U.N. Doc. A/47/908 (1993).
246. G.A. Res. 46/7, supra note 15; G.A. Res. 46/138, supra note 242; G.A. Res. 47/
20A, supra note 16. Adopted October 12, 1991, the first United Nations General Assem-
bly resolution, Resolution 46/7 followed on the heels of the second OAS resolution,
Resolution 2/91, and responded to the OAS Ministers' request that the Member states
of the United Nations adopt the same measures as the OAS Member states. G.A. Res.
46/7, supra note 15. Resolution 46/7 condemned the coup and the violation of human
rights, acknowledged Aristide's government as the legitimate government, and called
on Member States to comply with the measures established by the OAS. Id. The resolu-
tion also provided for an increase in economic and social development aid to
strengthen Haiti's democratic institutions. Id. The following resolution, entitled
Human Rights in Haiti adopted at the end of 1991 focused on human rights violations
and on the refugees fleeing the country due to violations. GA Res. 46/138, supra note
242. On November 24, 1992, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 47/20A
detailing which goods Member States should embargo, reiterating that increased aid
was forthcoming once constitutional order returneed, and urging U.N. Member States
and other international organizations to increase their humanitarian assistance. G.A.
Res. 47/20A, supra note 16.
247. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. Under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, which pertains
to the pacific settlement of disputes, the Security Council may (1) call upon parties to
settle their dispute through negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, or to resort to regional agencies, or other peaceful means, (2) inves-
tigate, (3) recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment, or refer legal
disputes to the ICJ, (4) if the dispute could not be settled by the ICJ, (a) take action
pursuant to Article 36, or (b) recommend terms of settlement it considers appropriate,
and (5) make recommendation to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the
dispute. U.N. CHARTER arts. 33, 34, 36-38.
248. G.A. Res. 47/20A, supra note 16. The final Situation of Democracy and Human
Rights resolution of 1992, stated in its seventh preambular paragraph:
Concerned that the persistence of this situation contributes to a climate of fear of
persecution and economic dislocation which could increase the number of Haitians
seeking refuge in neighboring Member States and convinced that a reversal of
this situation is needed to prevent its negative repercussions on the region.
Id. (emphasis added); see also MRE Res 1/91, supra note 229 (referring to Haiti's coup
as threat to democracy in region).
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Chapter VII measures. 49 In a speech to the United Nations
General Assembly in September 1992, Aristide called for a
stronger embargo and an end to the import of weapons, even if
a blockade were necessary.
2 50
ii. Security Council Resolutions: Selective Mandatory Measures
. By early 1993, the deteriorating situation in Haiti high-
lighted the need to put stronger pressure on the defacto military
government.2 51 In June 1993, the General Assembly forwarded
the issue of the Haitian crisis to the Security Council pursuant to
Article 11 (3) of the U.N. Charter. 52 The Security Council ulti-
mately intervened at the behest of Aristide and the de jure gov-
ernment,253 thereby eliminating any potential problems regard-
ing unlawful intervention under Article 2(7) of the U.N. Char-
ter.2 54 Following the de jure government's consent to impose
249. LES NATIONS UNIES ET LA SITUATION EN HAITI, supra note 16, at 1-2. Dante
Caputo, nominated in December of 1992, proceeded with his negotiations but did not
get very far in drawing the two camps of the defacto and dejure governments together.
Id. at 2. In late March 1993, the United Nations made progress in creating MICIVIH, to
try to resolve Haiti's political crisis, but the international community still wavered. Id. at
4-5.
250. Address to the General Assembly by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Sept.
29, 1992 (A/47/PV.17).
251. AGENCE HAITIENNE DE PRESSE, 1993 Au QUOTIDIEN, 7-17 (1994). In January
1993, the defacto government had called for elections of one third of the Senate. Id.
The OAS had immediately condemned the elections as illegitimate, and the Secretary-
General of the United Nations had requested that the de facto government cancel the
elections. Id.
252. U.N. CHARTER, art. 11, 3. "The General Assembly may call the attention of
the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and
security." Id.
253. See Letter from the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the President of the
Security Council (June 7 1991), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25958 (1993) reprinted in LES
NATIONS UNIFS ET HAITi, supra note 4, at 303 (asking that U.N. Security Council make
mandatory and universal OAS sanctions) [hereinafter June 7 Letter]
254. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, 7. See June 7 Letter, supra note 253 (stating that resolv-
ing Haiti's crisis would promote stability in region and strengthen international peace
and security). Fritz Longchamp, Haiti's Permanent Representative to the United Na-
tions, requested that
the Security Council make universal and mandatory the sanctions against the
defacto authorities adopted at the Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers for Foreign
Affairs of the Organization of American States and recommended to the inter-
national community in various General Assembly resolutions, giving priority to
the embargo on petroleum products and the supply of arms and munitions.
Id. See also supra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing role of consent given by
targeted state to intervene).
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sanctions, 2 55 the Security Council decided to proceed under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and unanimously adopted Res-
olution 841.256
Resolution 841, similarly to the previous General Assembly
resolutions, set forth measures which were consistent with the
trade embargo recommended by the OAS. 257  Acting under
Chapter VII, and recalling Chapter VIII and the need for coop-
eration between the United Nations and regional organizations,
the Security Council asserted that the continuation of humanita-
rian crises, economic displacement, and a climate of fear and
persecution threatened international peace and security. 258 Res-
255. June 7 Letter, supra note 253.
256. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 2.
257. Id.
258. Id. Because Aristide was calling for mandatory measures which would have to
be taken under Article 41, the Security Council, as a procedural obligation, had to find
that the crisis in Haiti constituted a threat to international peace and security. U.N.
CHARTER art. 39; June 7 Letter, supra note 253. The United States, since September 1991,
had referred to the international problems Haiti was causing particularly for the United
States. Donna Hrinack Testimony, supra note 238. In her testimony, Donna Hrinack gave
four reasons why the United States needed to help Haiti, notably that 1) the United
States had a humanitarian obligation to the people of Haiti, 2) the situation in Haiti
had a direct, material impact on other areas of interest to the United States, particularly
the boat people issue, 3) to curb drug trafficking, and 4) the overthrow of Aristide was a
setback to the consolidation of democracy throughout the hemisphere. Id. President
Clinton's administration put forth slightly different set of reasons than the Bush Admin-
istration to justify the United States' action in Haiti, notably that the United States
must protect American lives .... want[s] to avoid a mass exodus of Haitians
fleeing political persecution at great risk to themselves and at great potential
cost and disruption to the United States and to other nations .... to help
restore democracy in Haiti and thereby promote democracy throughout the
hemisphere.
PRESS RELEASE FROM THE WHITE HOUSE, Oct. 18, 1993. The boat people were the pri-
mary concern for the United States because they could have had a direct impact on the
United States, particularly Florida. See Rick Eyerdam, Amid a Tempest of Concerns, a Re-
gional Recovery Blossoms, S. FLA. Bus. J., Dec. 28, 1992, at 3 (discussing potential impact
of influx of Haitian immigrants on Florida's economy). Boat people refers to the poor
Haitians who fled Haiti on overcrowded boats, mostly since Aristide's overthrow in
1991, to try and come to the U.S. or to be picked up by the U.S. Coast Guard. Thomas
D.Jones, The Haitian Refugee Crisis: A Quest for Human Rights, 15 MICH.J. INT'L L. 77, 92-
93. The Boat People eventually came to cost the American taxpapyer a large amount of
money. William E. Gibson, Cost of Refugee Crisis Climbs, SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 30, 1994, at
1. From 1993 to 1994 the Pentagon and U.S. Coast Guard spent "over $250 million to
seize, process, detain, and transport Haitian boat people." Id. The United States, how-
ever, as well as other members of the United Nations, came to see the boat people as
the result of the dire circumstances prevailing in Haiti, especially the social and eco-
nomic circumstances, as reflected in the fact that the majority of the boat people who
had hearings were returned to Haiti because they were considered to be economic and
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olution 841 called for selective measures to resolve Haiti's crisis
and imposed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti. 59 Resolution
841 froze the assets of the Government of Haiti as well as of the
defacto authorities and prohibited all traffic from entering Hai-
tian territory carrying any armaments or petroleum products. 6 °
The Resolution called upon U.N. Member States to implement it
properly.2 61 The Security Council set up a Sanctions Committee
to monitor and facilitate the implementation of the sanctions
called for by the Resolution. 62 The Resolution included a
clause to allow for the delivery of fuel for humanitarian pur-
poses.2 63 The long-term purpose of the United Nations' policy
was to reinstate democracy in Haiti through negotiations. 264
The purpose of the sanctions therefore was to facilitate the nego-
tiation process and give Dante Caputo 265 some leverage with
which to force the military to the negotiating table. 66
The Security Council intended the sanctions to be short
environmental as opposed to political refugees. SeeJones, supra note 258, at 86 (argu-
ing that although Haitian refugees were more often characterized as economic
emigrants, Haiti's poor human rights record is sufficient evidence that many Haitian
refugees probably satisfied criteria for political refugee status).
259. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 2, at 5. Resolution 841 prohibited the:
sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag
vessels or aircraft, of petroleum or petroleum products or arms or related ma-
tfriel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and
equipment, police equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned,
whether or not originating in their territories, to any person or body in Haiti
or to any person or body for the purpose of any business carried on in or
operated from Haiti, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories
which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply.
Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 9.
262. Id. at 1 10.
263. Id. at 7.
264. See LEs NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 4 (suiting that international
community used sanctions to aid process of negotiations).
265. See supra, note 16 (discussing role of Dante Caputo as Special Envoy).
266. United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thou-
sand Two Hundred and Thirty-Eighth Meeting, S/PV.3238, 16June 1993, at 14 [hereinafter
Provisional Verbatim Record]. Venezuela's representative to the Security Council, Mr. Ar-
ria, outlined the previous efforts by both the OAS and the United Nations prior to
Resolution 841 and said that the United Nations had a duty to restore Aristide to power
as part of the democratization process it had begun when it monitored the 1990 elec-
tions. Id. Arria reiterated that the embargo was not "... an end in itself, but.. .a means
to give [Dante Caputo] an additional deterrent so that the negotiations will continue
and will achieve the goal we all seek." Id.
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term instruments. 26 7 Resolution 841 was scheduled to go into
effect on June 23, 1993 unless the military began negotiations
with Dante Caputo.2 a The sanctions imposed pursuant to Reso-
lution 841 came into effect on June 23, 1993, but by June 27,
Raoul C~dras, the nominal head of the defacto government, and
President Aristide agreed to meet in New York.269 On July 3,
1993, C~dras and Aristide signed the Governors Island Agree-
ment (the "Agreement") .270 The parties to the Agreement
agreed that once the Haitian Parliament confirmed the appoint-
ment of a Prime Minister of Aristide's choice, the United Na-
tions and the OAS would suspend their sanctions. 271 The Hai-
tian Parliament approved Aristide's candidate, Robert Malval, on
August 25, 1993.272 Acting under Chapter VII and unanimously
adopting Resolution 861 on August 27, 1993, the Security Coun-
cil suspended the measures it had called for under Resolution
841.273 Resolution 861 also maintained the possibility of
reimposing sanctions, should any party to the agreement fail to
meet its obligations. 27
4
In August 1993, the United Nations proceeded to adopt
Resolution 862 to send an initial contingent of U.N. civilian po-
lice and military assistance to Haiti to lay the groundwork for
UNMIH 275 to modernize the Haitian armed forces. 276 By Sep-
267. Id. Despite the differences of the Security Council members as to the issues
they wanted to stress surrounding the sanctions, the member states generally agreed
that the measures were necessary and needed to be temporary and very short-term. Id.
268. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 2.
269. LEs NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 5.
270. Governors Island Agreement, supra note 16.
271. Id.
272. 1993 Au QUOTIDIEN, supra note 251, at 90.
273. S.C. Res. 861, U.N. SCOR, 3271st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/861 (1993).
274. Id. at 2.
275. See supra note 19 (outlining evolution of UNMIH and of its mandate).
276. S.C. Res. 862, U.N. SCOR, 3272nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/862 (1993). Made-
leine Albright, speaking after the Resolution was adopted, said that the Resolution
marked a crucial next step in the process envisioned by the Governor's Island
Agreement. That process was not a 'quick fix'. The parties recognized that a
lasting settlement in Haiti required fundamental changes, and that the pro-
cess the international community had helped them to establish provided the
opportunity to make those changes in an orderly and peaceful manner.
The provision of United Nations military and police personnel was vital to
the reorientation and rebuilding of Haiti. The international community's
commitment would not end with the restoration of constitutional govern-
ment, but would continue until democratic institutions were firmly in place.
The modernization of Haiti's armed forces, and the creation of a distinct and
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tember of that year, the situation in Haiti deteriorated rapidly as
the violence increased.2 7 7 On September 17, 1993, the President
of the Security Council made a statement condemning the vio-
lence and recalling that, should the Secretary General feel it was
necessary to reimpose sanctions because of serious non-compli-
ance with the Agreement, the Security Council was prepared to
do so. 2 78 The Harlan County, the ship bringing the initial con-
tingent of personnel to Haiti pursuant to Resolution 862, did
not dock in Port-au-Prince, following the demonstrations at the
dock by attachis on October 11, 1993.279
On October 13, 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolu-
tion 873, reversing the suspension of 841 and allowing funds fro-
zen pursuant to Resolution 841 to be released at the request of
Aristide or Malval s.2 ° The Security Council also stated its readi-
ness to consider other measures if necessary. 28 ' The assassina-
tion of Haitian de jure Minister of Justice Guy Malary, in broad
daylight on October 14, 199322 prompted Aristide to write a let-
ter on October 15 to the Secretary General requesting that the
United Nations strengthen the provisions already in place under
Resolution 873.28 On October 16, 1993, reaffirming its readi-
ness to consider other measures, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 875, requesting that Member States strictly enforce
the sanctions called for by Resolutions 841 and 873.24 When
professional civilian police, in the context of reform of the entire system of
justice, were among Haiti's most pressing goals.
United Nations Security Council, Press Release/Background Note, SC/5693,
Aug. 31, 1993.
277. Howard French, Public Killing Defines Barriers to Aristide's Return, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1993, at A24.
278. United Nations Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council,
U.N. SCOR, 3278th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/26460 (1993).
279. Howard French, Haitians Block Landing of US. Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1993, at Al.
280. S.C. Res. 873, U.N. SCOR, 3291st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/873 (1993).
281. Id.
282. Howard French, Haiti Justice Minister Slain in Defiance of U.S. Warning to Mili-
tary to Keep Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at Al.
283. Letter dated 15 October 1993from the President of Haiti Jean Bertrand Aristide to the
Secretary General, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/26587, (1993), reprinted in LES NATIONS UNIES
ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 333.
284. S.C. Res. 875, U.N. SCOR, 3293rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/875 (1993). In
particular, Resolution 875 stated that Member States should stop, as necessary, all ships
headed towards Haiti to inspect and verify their cargoes. Id. The Resolution did not
specify which Member State(s) would supply the monitoring ships but the United States
did most of the intercepting. 1993 AU QUOTIDIEN, supra note 251, at 115. Officially
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adopting Resolutions 873 and 875, the Security Council changed
the wording and the meaning of what constituted a threat to
international peace and security and expressly blamed the mili-
tary de facto government for the Haitian crisis.285
iii. Comprehensive Mandatory Measures
Resolution 875 remained in effect until May 6, 1994, during
which time Dante Caputo shuttled to and from Haiti to negoti-
ate a political truce286 and the United Nations attempted to
reconfigure and deploy UNMIH.287 By November of 1993, Aris-
tide began requesting that the United Nations strengthen the
embargo. 88 Whereas the previous Security Council resolutions
sought only to deprive Haiti of select goods, 89 the Security
Council changed its strategy in May 1994 and imposed compre-
hensive sanctions. 2 9  On May 6, 1994, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 917, imposing comprehensive sanctions
known as the Maritime Interdiction Force, the flotilla of ships monitoring the waters off
Haiti came to be seen by the Haitian press and eventually the majority of Haitians as a
maritime blockade of Haiti. Id. at 113.
285. S.C. Res. 873, supra note 280; S.C. Res. 875, supra note 284. Under both reso-
lutions, the military officials' "failure to fulfill their obligations under the Agreement
constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region." Id.
286. See LES NATIONS UNIES ET HATI, supra note 4, at 49-50 (describing attempts by
Dante Caputo to negotiate with Haitian military in Haiti).
287. See id. at 55 (stating that Security Council requested that Boutros-Chali draw
up plans for 'appropriate' UNMIH force to send to Haiti when situation permitted); see
id. at 56 (declaring that despite UNMIH's inability to fulfill its mandate because of lack
of cooperation from Haitian military, U.N. Security Council extended UNMIH's man-
date in order to redeploy UNMIH).
288. See Fritz Longchamp's comments in Minutes to the Security Council's 3376th
Meeting Following the Adoption of Resolution 917, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. SC/5841, (1994)
(discussing Aristide's request); see also Michael D. Barnes, Counsel to Aristide, Testimony
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., March 8, 1994 (suggesting that United Nations
should impose more stringent sanctions). "Some worry that increasing the commercial
sanctions on Haiti will irrevocably destroy it. This concern is well intentioned but mis-
guided .... Our refusal to toughen sanctions prolongs the crisis and the reign of
terror. It also prolongs ordinary Haitians' poverty and misery." Id.
289. See S.C. Res. 841, supra note 2 (asking that U.N. Member States prevent sale
or supply of petroleum and petroleum products, weapons and ammunition, and other
military equipment to any person or body in Haiti).
290. See S.C. Res. 917, supra note 3 (announcing that U.N. Member States should
ban all non-commercial flights to or from Haiti, deny entry into their territory of Hai-
tian military or police officers and their families, major participants in coup and their
families, members of illegal government and their families, and persons employed by or
acting on behalf of military, freeze assets of all those individuals, halt all imports to and
exports from Haiti, and halt inward and outward maritime shipping to inspect cargoes).
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targeted primarily at the de facto government and its support-
ers. 91 The United Nations announced that it would not lift Res-
olution 917 unless certain conditions were met,292 notably that
Raoul C~dras, the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed
Forces retire," 3 that the measures called for under the Gover-
nors' Island Agreement take effect,2 194 that UNMIH be able to
fulfill its mandate in Haiti,295 and that Aristide return to Haiti
with constitutional order assured.2 96
Resolution 917 also expanded on the duties of the Sanc-
tions Committee to enable it to verify Member States' compli-
ance with these latest measures. 97 Similarly to Resolution 841,
setting out guidelines for the Sanctions Committee, Resolution
917 did not mention the need to monitor the impact of sanc-
tions on Haiti.2 9 8 The Sanctions Committee's concern lay in the
implementation of the Resolution rather than its effect on the
Haitian population. 99
On July 11, 1994, the de facto government, defying the
United Nations and the international community at large, or-
dered the MICVIH to leave. s0 At the end of July, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 940, authorizing the invasion of Ha-
iti by a multinational force, should the circumstances warrant
it."' l The Haitian military authorities reacted to the threat of
military force and quickly settled on an agreement brokered in
September by former U.S. President Carter, former U.S. Chief of
Staff Powell, and U.S. Senator Nunn.s°2 On September 29, 1994,
291. Id.
292. Id. at 18.
293. Id. at 18(a).
294. Id. at 18(b) and (c).
295. Id. atl 18(d).
296. Id. atl 18(e).
297. Id. The Sanctions Committee, for instance had to maintain a list of the Hai-
tians prohibited from travelling outside of Haiti. Id. at 3. The Sanctions Committee
also was given a series of other tasks such as clearing flights to Haiti containing humani-
tarian aid. See id. at 14 (listing Sanctions Committee's tasks).
298. Id.
299. See id. at 14(g) (requiring Sanctions Committee to examine sender Member
States's request for assistance pursuant to Article 50). See also U.N. CHARTER, art. 50,
supra notes 157-161 and accompanying text (discussing Article 50).
300. LEs NATIONS UNIES ET HAITi, supra note 4, at 56.
301. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 16. In the resolution, the Security Council referred
to the "deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature" of Haiti's situation. Id. at 2.
302. See Rohter, supra note 8 (discussing settlement negotiated with Haitian de
facto government by Carter, Powell, and Nunn).
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the Security Council voted to remove the sanctions once Aristide
returned to Haiti. 3  Resolution 944 effectively ended the U.N.
Security Council's sanctions policy toward Haiti." °4
iv. Sanctions Committee and Ad Hoc Committee
With the adoption of the Security Council resolutions, the
United Nations had to construct an ad hoc framework to monitor
the implementation of sanctions.30 5 Pursuant to Resolution 841,
the Security Council established a Sanctions Committee con-
cerning Haiti, a subsidiary body of the Security Council, consist-
ing of all the members of the Council.30 6 The Committee, as do
all U.N. Sanctions Committees, held its sessions behind closed
doors and made little information available to the general pub-
lic.3
0 7
Sanctions Committees generally draw up guidelines to facili-
tate their work and to help Member States and international or-
ganizations with the implementation of the sanctions.30 8 The
Sanctions Committee established pursuant to Resolution 841, is-
sued a set of guidelines to provide a framework for carrying out
its assigned tasks. 0 9 Member States in turn were responsible for
implementing the sanctions.3 10 The Sanctions Committee would
monitor the implementation process through the submission of
reports by Member States. 11 In the case of sanctions imposed
on Haiti, few Member States actually submitted reports to the
Committee following the adoption of Resolution 841.12 The Se-
303. S.C. Res. 944, U.N. SCOR, 3430th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/944 (1994).
304. Id.
305. See Ngobi, supra note 25, at 22 (discussing creation of sanctions committees
by Security Council to monitor implementation of sanctions).
306. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 2, at 10. The Security Council outlined the Sanc-
tions Committee's obligations in Resolution 841, at 10, Resolution 873 at 3, and
Resolution 917 at 3, 7(b), 8 and 14. Id.; Res. 873, supra note 280, at 3; Res.
917, supra note 3, at s 3, 7(b), 8, 14.
307. See Ngobi, supra note 25, ai 22 (writing that sanctions committees conduct
business behind closed doors so as to not embarass states violating sanctions).
308. Id.
309. Telephone Interview with Mr. Gianluca Burci, Legal Officer, U.N. Office of
Legal Affairs (July 23, 1997). The Sanctions Committee's guidelines are a restricted
document and are unavailable to the public. Id.
310. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 2, at 13.
311. Ngobi, supra note 25, at 22.
312. See Note by the Secretary General, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/26173 (1993) reprinted
in LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 313 (listing Member States submitting
reports). In paragraph 13 of Resolution 841 (1993) for instance, the Security Council
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curity Council eventually called on all international organiza-
tions to help implement the sanctions.313
The United Nations, in conjunction with the OAS, also cre-
ated a local mechanism in Haiti to monitor the allocation of fuel
for humanitarian purposes. 14 The mechanism came into exist-
ence after the adoption of Resolution 875 and began function-
ing in January 1994.15 Established by the United Nations and
the OAS, a committee known as Programme D'approvisionnement en
Combustible pour les Activitis Humanitaires316 ("PAC-Humanitaire"
or "PAC") regulated the allocation of the fuel allowed in under
the embargo for humanitarian purposes. 317 The PAC's objective
was to minimize repercussions of the embargo on the health and
nutrition of the most vulnerable segments of the Haitian popula-
had requested that all states report to the Secretary-General by July 16, 1993 on the
measures they had initiated for meeting the obligations set out in 841. S.C. Res. 841,
supra note 2, 13. As of July 26, 1993, only 16 replies had been received including
those from the United States and Switzerland, which is not a member of the United
Nations. Note by the Secretary General, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/26173 (1993) reprinted in
LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 313. By August 30, 1993, three days after
Resolution 841 had been suspended, only twenty-six members had replied. Note &y the
Secretary-General: Addendum, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/26173/Add.1 (1993) reprinted in
LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAM, supra note 4, at 313. Neither the major oil producing
states nor the Dominican Republic, Haiti's neighbor and main source of black market
goods were on the Secretary-General's list. Id.; see Pas d'Intervention en Haiti avant la mi-
Septembre, Selon le Washington Post, La MATIN, Aug. 6-10, 1994, at 1 (citing statistic that by
1994, 30 per cent of Haiti's energy needs during embargo came over Dominican Re-
public border).
313. S.C. Res. 917, supra note 3, 1 12. The Security Council called upon
all States, including States not members of the United Nations, and all interna-
tional organizations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the
present resolution and the earlier relevant resolutions, notwithstanding the
existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any interna-
tional agreement or any contract entered into or any license permit granted to
prior to the effective date of the measures in this resolution or earlier relevant
resolutions.
Id.
314. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES/UNITED NATIONS, PROGRAMME
D'APPROVISIONNEMENT EN COMBUSTIBLE POUR LES AcTIVITts HUMANITAiRES: BROCHURE
EXPLICATIVE (1994) 1 [hereinafter BROCHURE EXPLICATIVE].
315. Le PAC Humanitaire Arrite ses Activitis, LE NOUVELLISTE, Oct. 27, 1994, at 1
(reporting that Programme d'Approvisionnement en Combustible pour les Activit6s
Humanitaires ("PAC-Humanitaire" or "PAC") was created in December 1993 and began
distributing fuel in January 1994). From January to October 1994 PAC distributed
three million gallons of diesel and seven hundred thousand gallons of gasoline, repre-
senting eight and a half per cent and five per cent, respectively, of total national con-
sumption. Id.
316. BROCHURE EXPLICATIVE, supra note 314, at 1.
317. Id. at 1.
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tion by permitting non-profit organizations to maintain their es-
sential humanitarian activities through a minimal allocation of
petroleum.' 8
II. EFFECTIVENESS OF U.N. SANCTIONS
Due to the recent surge in the use of sanctions by the
United Nations,319 the international community began question-
ing the effectiveness of collective sanctions as a foreign policy
tool.3 20 In addition, sanctions initiated since 1990 have tended
to last longer, be more costly and complex, and be less successful
than prior sanctions regimes.32 1 The sanction debate centers in
part around what constitutes an effective sanctions episode.3"
The sanctions the United Nations imposed on Haiti aptly illus-
trate how sanctions can be ineffective.323
A. General Effectiveness of U.N. Sanctions
Sanctions are generally considered an effective foreign pol-
icy tool because, without resorting to the use of force, sanctions
condemn the acts of the target state, support diplomatic maneu-
vering with concrete deeds, and send a message to sender states
318. Id. PAC bought small amounts of fuel on the international market with the
consent of the Sanctions Committee. Id. A sub-committee known as the Comiti de Ges-
tion du Carburant determined the agencies or institutions eligible to receive fuel and was
comprised of representatives from the constitutional dejure government of Haiti, from
U.N. agencies, from NGOs active in the country, and from countries contributing finan-
cially to the program. Id. at 2. The international community subsidized the initial ship-
ment of fuel. Id. at 3. Participants in the program financed the following shipment by
paying a fee which was as near as possible to the price of fuel at the pump. Id. at 4. The
payments for the fuel were made in dollars or through a pre-arranged agreement, in
Haitian Gourdes. Id. at 5.
319. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing increase in number of
times United Nations Security Council resorted to sanctions).
320. See, e.g., John Stremlau, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Sharpening Interna-
tional Sanctions: Toward A Stronger Role for the United Nations (Nov. 1996) <http://
www.carnegie.org> (discussing use of sanctions by United Nations and suggesting ways
to improve them); Ivan Eland, Economic Sanctions as Tools of Foreign Policy, in ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS: PANACEA OR PEACEBUILDING?, supra note 25, at 29-42 (analyzing effectiveness
of sanctions as foreign policy tools); Joyner, supra note 137, at 73-87 (criticizing effec-
tiveness of U.N. sanctions).
321. Stremlau, supra note 320, at 4.
322. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing various views on how to
evaluate impact of sanctions).
323. See LES NATIONS UNIES ET HAII, supra note 4, at 4 (stating that sanctions
imposed on Haiti did not help remove the defacto government and aggravated Haiti's
socio-economic situation).
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nationals that the sender government is willing to protect vital
national interests.8 24 Sanctions are also considered effective be-
cause the sender state can often implement them at low cost to
itself 3 25 U.N. sanctions imposed on Haiti pursuant to Security
Council resolution 841326 were initially considered to be effective
because they brought the Haitian military government to the ne-
gotiating table and led to the signing of the Agreement.32
7
U.N. sanctions nonetheless have been criticized as policy
tools for a number of reasons.328 Sanctions are often the wrong
tools to use because their goals are too elusive, the sanctions are
not coercive enough, and other countries are not cooperating
sufficiently or may even openly defy the sanctions.329 Sanctions
may furthermore create their own antidotes by unifying the
country in support of the government330 or in search of commer-
cial alternatives. 33 ' New economic elites may emerge with the
creation of alternative black markets and the realignment of vari-
ous economic sectors. 32 Sanctions may alienate allies abroad
and business interests at home in the sender state (s) ."s In addi-
tion to being reactive instruments, sanctions take time to have
324. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 103, at 11.
325. See THE UNITED NATIONS AND MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS, supra 104, at 7 (stat-
ing that attractiveness of sanctions is due to their low cost).
326. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 2.
327. See supra note 16 (outlining negotiations leading up to Governors Island
Agreement).
328. See supra note 320 (setting forth several approaches to studying effectiveness
of sanctions).
329. ECONOMICS SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 103, at 12.
330. Johnathan Galtung, supra note 109, at 33. The conspicuous sacrifice by lead-
ers might have a propaganda effect and may result in social and political integration
rather than disintegration of the target state. Id. at 35.
331. ECONOMICS SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 103, at 10.
332. Galtung, supra note 109, at 33.
333. ECONOMICS SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 103, at 11. With respect to
Haiti, European nations did not comply with the sanctions recommended by the U.N.
General Assembly. STREMLAU, supra note 320. The Dominican Republic was a constant
source of supplies for Haiti. See, e.g., Howard W. French, Embargo Creates 'Oil Boom'Near
Haitian Border, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 1994, at 5; see also M. Jennifer MacKay, Economic
Sanctions: Are They Actually Enforcing International Law in Serbia-Montenegro?, 3 TUL. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 203, 232-233 (1995) (arguing that sanctions imposed by U.N. Security
Council Resolution 757 against Serbia-Montenegro to end violence in former Yugosla-
via, hurt economically-disadvantaged neighboring Eastern bloc sender countries who
relied on trade with Serbia-Montenegro); see also Gary Spencer, U.N. Official Discusses
Sanctions' Viability, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 24, 1991, at 1 (quoting U.N. Under Secretary-General
for Legal Affairs as saying that protection of neighboring states from fallout of sanctions
must be improved for more effective use of sanctions).
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full effect.3" 4 A recent argument to emerge since U.N. imposed
sanctions on Iraq in 1990 concerns the effect of sanctions on the
target state's population. 3 5 Critics of U.N. sanctions tend to
point to the collateral human cost of sanctions as a reason to
limit their use.336 Wealthy countries do not want to establish a
fund or alternative mechanisms to compensate the target state's
as well as non-target states' populations hurt by the sanctions.337
334. THE UNITED NATIONS AND MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS, supra note 104, at 8-9.
335. Stremlau, supra note 320. See Madeleine Albright, supra note 9, at 1602
(describing insufficiency of sanctions as means to alter behaviour of Haitian military
and hardship sanctions imposed on vast majority of Haiti's population); Jeong Hwa
Pires, North Korean Time Bomb: Can Sanctions Defuse it? A Review of International Economic
Sanctions as an Option, 24 GA.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 307, 337-338 (1994) (stating that Haiti
clearly illustrated problem of human costs of sanctions and discussing cost of recon-
struction following lifting of sanctions); Joy K Fausey, Does the United Nations' Use of
Collective Sanctions to Protect Human Rights Violate Its Own Human Rights Standards?, 10
CONN. J. INT'L L. 193, 204 (1994) (arguing that U.N. sanctions destroy the right to
adequate standard of living). See F.B.I.S., Events in and Concerning Haiti, Jan. 31, 1995
(reporting that international community found itself pledging $900 million to revive
Haitian economy in 1995 following lifting of sanctions). See generally SUPPLEMENT TO AN
AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 11, at 70-76 (discussing effect of sanctions and recom-
mending creation of new mechanism to assess impact of sanction on target before sanc-
tions are applied, to monitor application of sanctions, to measure effect of sanctions, to
ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to assist Member States experiencing
collateral damage and applying for exemption pursuant to Article 50). Boutros Bout-
ros-Ghali wrote:
70. Sanctions, as is generally recognized, are a blunt instrument. They raise
the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the
target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders
whose behavior is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects. Sanc-
tions also always have unintended or unwanted effects. They can complicate
the work of humanitarian agencies by denying them certain categories of sup-
plies and by obliging them to go through arduous procedures to obtain the
necessary exemptions. They can conflict with the development objectives of
the Organization and do long-term damage to the productive capacity of the
target country. They can have a severe effect on other countries that are
neighbors or major economic partners of the target country. They can also
defeat their own purpose by provoking a patriotic response against the inter-
national community, symbolized by the United Nations, and by rallying the
population behind the leaders whose behavior the sanctions are intended to
modify.
Id. at 70; see generally THE REPORT, supra note 239 (assessing impact of sanctions on
Haitian population).
336. See Stremlau, supra note 320 (observing that damages sanctions inflict on in-
nocent civilians in target state have become pivotal to Member States' argument to limit
intrusiveness and scope of sanctions).
337. Id. States have refused to set up the fund because of the financial burden it
entails. Id. Moreover, non-target states' request to set up a fund to assist them should
sanctions adversly impact them, is a way for them to challenge the Security Council's
lack of accountability. Id. As the United Nations stands now, Members of the Security
1997] U.N. SANCTIONS IN HAITI 1929
From a legal perspective, the extraterritorial effects of sanc-
tions may make them legally suspect.33 8 A state, however, has the
legal authority to create a law that would affect extraterritorial
transactions.3 3 9 Another reason to suspect the legality of sanc-
tions is the poor track record of sanctions in the foreign private
litigation context.3 4 °
From a procedural standpoint, collective sanctions author-
ized by the United Nations encounter a number of criticisms.34'
Most countries do not have the legal or logistical infrastructure
to implement the sanctions.342 Despite the United Nations' 185
members, sanctions remain in the control of the five superpow-
ers sitting on the Security Council, 43 because only the Security
Council can authorize the use of coercive measures.344 Less in-
fluential Member States have little or no say in the application of
sanctions by the United Nations. 43 Moreover, China and Rus-
sia, for instance, generally oppose intervention by the United
Nations in the internal affairs of a state for fear of an erosion of
their sovereign protection and, in the case of China, to avoid
criticism of its human rights practices.3 4 6
Council may veto sanctions targeted at them and impose sanctions against others. Id.
The issue also brings to the fore the divisions between rich and poor countries at a time
of increasing socio-economic disparities between the two groups. Id.
338. MALLOY, supra note 108, at 610-611.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Stremlau, supra note 320.
342. Id. The problem was aptly illustrated in the small number of responses the
United Nations got from Member States regarding the measures they were undertaking
to impose the sanctions on Haiti. See supra, note 312 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing submission of reports by Member States to Security Council regarding implementa-
tion of sanctions).
343. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (setting forth structure of Security
Council).
344. Stremlau, supra note 320.
345. Id.
346. Id. Following the unanimous adoption of Resolution 841, a debate ensued
among the members of the Security Council, shedding light on the Member States'
positions on sanctions, Provisional Verbatim Record, supra note 266, at 9. The U.N. repre-
sentatives of the Bahamas, Canada, and Haiti requested and were granted permission to
sit in and contribute to the meeting. Id. Canada began the meeting by reiterating that
it had all along unreservedly supported the OAS sanctions and would continue to sup-
port the sanctions proposed by the Security Council. Id. at 6-7. The President of the
Security Council observed that the adoption of the resolution "is warranted by the
unique and exceptional situation in Haiti and should not be regarded as constituting a
precedent," a view echoed by both the Pakistani and Chinese delegates to the Security
Council who expressed that their vote for the resolution was not indicative of an official
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position for future resolutions of a similar sort. Id. at 21. China's delegate restated
China's usual policy toward sanctions and added that only because of Haiti's excep-
tional circumstances had China decided to vote in favor of the resolution. Id. He said
that
[t]he Chinese delegation, as its consistent position, does not favor the Security
Council's handling of matters which are essentially internal affairs of a Mem-
ber State, nor does it approve of resorting lightly to such mandatory measures
as sanctions by the Council. We wish to point out that the favorable vote cast
by the Chinese delegation cast just now does not mean any change in that
position.
Id. Mr. Mrime of France injected a word of caution when he said that "it will be
necessary for the Council to tighten these measures if once again, no tangible result
emerges from the talks." Id. at 9. Brazil voted in favor of the sanctions in the hope that
the United Nations would not have to apply them. Id. at 18. Madeleine Albright, the
United States' representative to the United Nations said that sanctions were not a solu-
tion to the Haitian crisis, that "the international community cannot solve the Haitian.
crisis. Only the Haitians themselves can do that ... Haitians in leadership positions
now must do their part. We look to them to demonstrate the patriotism and statesman-
ship their country requires." Id. at 19. The members of the Security Council also met
following the adoption of Resolution 917. Minutes to the Security Council's 3376th Meeting
Following the Adoption of Resolution 917, supra note 288. The members' tone was cautious
and negative, given their prior experience. Id. For the first time, they voiced true criti-
cism of the use of sanctions, particularly of the sanctions' impact on Haitians. Id. The
Representatives of Venezuela, Brazil, France, the United States, and China made some
remarks on sanctions. Id. Enrique Tejera Paris of Venezuela, who was just sitting in at
this point and had no voting rights, said that "those responsible for the dictatorship
should understand that the sanctions were not reprisals." Id. Madeleine Albright of
the United States acknowledged that sanctions were a blunt instrument. Id. She re-
marked that
The United States was acutely conscious of the suffering of the Haitian people,
and of the potential of the sanctions to aggravate that suffering... Sanctions
were one of the most potent weapons the international community possessed.
That step imposed upon the country was a significant moral obligation - to
persevere and enforce the sanctions fully so that they achieved their objective
in the shortest possible time.
Id. Jean-Bertrand Mrime of France announced that the Council would regularly re-
view the sanctions and their humanitarian impact. Id. Ronaldo Sandenberg of Brazil
echoed Mrim~e warning that
the option pursued... raised, however, a number of issues of concern on the
possible deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Haiti, as a comprehen-
sive embargo might create additional suffering to the Haitian people. It was
important, thus, to keep under constant review any adverse consequences
which the extremely serious measures taken by the Council might entail. A
sanctions regime would never be an end in itself. . . It would be hard to
conceive the imposition of measures that affected an entire population being
adopted in a political vacuum.
Id. ChenJian of China was the only representative to admit that the suffering in Haiti
could be partly attributable to the previous sanctions. Id. He also reiterated his earlier
position, noting that "sanctions were not a panacea that could be applied whenever and
wherever it suited others for want of better solutions." Id.
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B. Effect of U.N. Sanctions in Haiti
The sanctions imposed on Haiti had widespread repercus-
sions, particularly on the poor, and aptly illustrate sanctions' in-
effectiveness. 47 Although Security Council Resolution 841 did
provide for limited quantities of oil to be imported for humani-
348 Rtarian purposes, and Resolution 917 exempted food and
medicine,349 the Resolutions created a defacto embargo on medi-
cal and preventive health care and food for rural Haiti.350 It is
difficult to assess the specific impact of embargoes on a popula-
tion because of other factors affecting the situation, such as a
previously unstable economy and government, a weak social
fabric, migration, and environmental catastrophes. 351  An em-
bargo, however, can contribute to and exacerbate pre-existing
problems. 352
1. Humanitarian Assistance
Sanctions impeded international assistance to Haiti. 53 As
the sanctions continued, humanitarian assistance became a ne-
cessity, replacing development assistance. 54 The primary em-
phasis for humanitarian assistance eventually became food and
feeding programs.35
347. See THE REPORT, supra note 239, at 20 (observing that sanctions exacerbated
Haiti's human crisis and that where sanctions were "broad and extended, the human
impact was correspondingly greater than where the instruments employed were time-
limited or sharp and targeted at the political elite").
348. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 2, 7.
349. S.C. Res. 917, supra note 3, 1 7 (a), (b), (c), (d).
350. See THE REPORT, supra note 239, at 23 (stating that customary exemption of
food and medicine in sanctions does not ensure the free and unconditional movement
of goods).
351. See id. at 20 (arguing that sanctions in Haiti "contribut[ed] to a 'syndrome,' a
multidimensional political crisis. As such, it becomes very difficult to disaggregate any
single element of the syndrome as being responsible for any particular humanitarian
insult.").
352. Id.
353. See id. at 23 (discussing restrictions put on humanitarian assistance by OAS,
United Nations, and United States).
354. Id. at 21.
355. See id. at 21 (observing that food and agriculture represented approximately
two thirds of humanitarian aid flows). By 1994, the Specialized Agencies and other
international and Haitian non-governmental organizations were distributing food to
over one million Haitians daily. United Nations Press Release, UNEmergency Coordinator
Appeals to Haitian De Facto Authorities to Release Urgently Needed Diesel and Petrol Shipment,
HI/43, IHA 535, 25 Aug. 1994. [hereinafter The Press Release]. By August 1994, CARE,
an American non-governmental organization, was feeding six hundred thousand Hai-
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The most severe restrictions imposed on the humanitarian
assistance program in Haiti during the sanctions were bureau-
cratic and political.356 Technically the Resolutions exempted
humanitarian assistance from the restrictions.3 5 7 Resolution 917,
however, gave exporting countries of foodstuffs and medical sup-
plies free reign to define what constituted foodstuffs and medi-
cal supplies.358 The United States, for instance, came up with a
particularly narrow definition for foodstuffs. 59 Some American
companies refused to deliver supplies to avoid potential legal
hassles in the United States.360
Because two of the purposes of the sanctions consisted of
isolating the de facto government diplomatically and not recog-
nizing it, 61 the Specialized Agencies, bilateral aid agencies, and
tians daily. Larry Rohter, Haiti's Hunger is Abundant while Food is Scant at Best, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 1994, at A16.
356. See THE REPORT, supra note 239, at 23 (discussing United Nations', OAS', and
United States' restriction of humanitarian assistance to non-governmental organization
("NGO") channels). By restricting the humanitarian assistance to NGO channels, the
United Nations, the OAS, and the United States sought to avoid the defacto government
who perceived the receipt and control of the aid as international political recognition
and legitimization. Id. at 22-3; see also Tim Johnson, Relief Worker Battles Two Foes: Hai-
tian Poverty, U.S. Bureaucracy, MIAmi HERALD, Aug. 29, 1994, at IA (describing U.S.
NGO's experience dealing with sanctions guidelines set out by U.S. Government).
357. See supra notes 348 and 349 and accompanying text (outlining Resolutions'
exemptions of humanitarian assistance).
358. See S.C. Res. 917, supra note 3, 7(a) (illustrating lack of specific definition of,
medical supplies and foodstuffs).
359. See Exec. Order No. 12,917, 59 Fed. Reg. 26,925 (1994) (announcing that
United States would allow the export of
medicines and medical supplies as authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury,
and flee, beans, sugar, wheat flour, cooking oil, corn flour, milk and edible
tallow, provided that neither the de facto regime in Haiti nor any person des-
ignated by the Secretary of the Treasury as a blocked individual or entity of
Haiti is a direct or indirect party to the transaction).
360. United Nations Development Programme, Rapport sur la Situation de l'Aide
Humanitaire en Haiti, 2 (May 27, 1994). Upjohn, the manufacturer of Depo-Provera,
the second most popular contraceptive in Haiti and supplied through UNFPA and
eventually NGOs, refused to deliver supplies in 1994, despite assurances by the WHO
that they fell into the category of medical supplies. Id.
361. Letter from Larry Crandall, Director of the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development ("USAID") to the Heads of International Organizations in Haiti
(June 17, 1994) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). Mr. Crandall
wrote:
We wish to emphasize the importance of maintaining the already strong
humanitarian program and the need to strengthen it in the face of extremely
difficult administrative and logistical obstacles....
With respect to implementation, we caution you to avoid unnecessary ac-
tions that might infer accepted authority or legitimacy to the illegal govern-
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NGOs could not work with the defacto government.362 This pol-
icy increased the scope of the Specialized Agencies' activities by
eliminating whatever support the government had previously
been supplying.3 63 The diplomatic isolation of the regime also
led the de facto authorities to exert whatever power they could
over the international community, not only to impede the sanc-
tions program but also to gain some sort of recognition or ac-
knowledgement of the de facto government.31 One of the re-
gime's tactics was to withhold the supplies, particularly oil sup-
plies, until governments or agencies applied to them for tax
exemptions, forcing the agencies to recognize the de facto gov-
ernment.365 Although the United Nations Emergency Relief Co-
ordinator and Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Af-
fairs insisted on the neutrality of U.N. humanitarian assist-
ment. You are especially cautioned to do as little as possible in meeting Hai-
tian de facto government administrative and other requests, but as much as
necessary to keep programs up and going while maintaining program account-
ability. We fully recognize this is a daunting task.
Id.
362. Id. The defacto Minister of Health,Jean Boisrond, for instance, gave an inter-
view on Haitian national radio and complained that the Ministry of Health did not
receive any aid from the international community, even from WHO which is supposed
to be a humanitarian agency. Interview with the "Minister of Health, Jean Boisrond (Radio
M~ropole, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Aug. 9, 1994). Because the international community
did not want to recognize the defacto government, the community suspended channel-
ing aid through the various Ministries. Id. An indirect repercussion, however, was that
public hospitals, for example, were not eligible to receive humanitarian fuel. Id. Fur-
thermore, the policy guidelines failed to distinguish between de facto governmental
political levels, such as ministers and other policy-makers, and operating public struc-
tures such as doctors at public hospitals. THE REPORT, supra note 239, at 23.
363. See THE REPORT, supra note 239, at 23 (discussing limited availability of vac-
cine supplies during embargo because U.N. Agencies could not use Haitian Ministry of
Health as procurement, storage and distribution center). Another example would be
the impact of the isolation and non-recognition policies on the FAO. Rapport sur la
Situation de l'Aide Humanitaire en Haiti, supra note 360, at 1. Because the FAO relied on
the Ministry of Agriculture for technical support but could no longer do so because of
the Ministry's defacto status, the implementation costs of certain projects increased for
the FAO. Id. The FAO therefore had to stock and distribute agricultural inputs, which
originally had been the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture. Id.
364. See THE REPORT, supra note 239, at 22 (observing that de facto government
perceived receipt and control of multilateral and bilateral aid as indication of interna-
tional recognition and legitimization).
365. See The Press Release, supra note 355 (referring to de facto government's with-
holding of ten thousand barrels of diesel and petrol meant for humanitarian assist-
ance); see also Kathie Klarreich, US Forced to Break Fuel Embargo in Haiti, CHRISTIAN ScL
MONITOR, Aug. 25, 1994, at 4 (quoting diplomat in Haiti as saying that "the only reason
they're [de facto military government] playing this game is to force us to deal with
them.").
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ance, 66 the de facto authorities continued to use humanitarian
aid as a means to gain political leverage. 67
The oil embargo, although technically allowing for ship-
ments of fuel for humanitarian purposes, 68 impeded the deliv-
ery of humanitarian assistance.3 69 Three hundred NGOs, bilat-
eral and multilateral humanitarian assistance programs relied on
the distribution of humanitarian fuel.3 70 The lack of fuel not
only limited transportation of supplies to rural and hard to ac-
cess areas, and prevented patients from reaching rural health
clinics, but also impeded the use of generators to supply electric-
ity for the health clinics.371 Eventually, the sanctions under Res-
366. The Press Release, supra note 355. The insistence on the neutrality of humani-
tarian assistance was in keeping with Boutros-Ghali's point that humanitarian aid
should be provided "in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and im-
partiality." AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 10, at 13.
367. See supra note 365 and accompanying text (outlining use of humanitarian
assistance by defacto government as political tool). The Harvard Report also argued
that, in 1993, the political arm of the United Nations tended to view humanitarian
assistance as political instrumentalities and the nascent humanitarian arm was not able
yet to formulate a strategy for neutral humanitarianism in a situation such as Haiti's.
THE REPORT, supra note 239, at 22.
368. See supra notes 348 and 349 and accompanying text (discussing exemptions
allowed under Resolutions 841 and 917); but see Judith Vandewater, Embargo is Killing
Haitians, says Area Doctor on Mercy Mission, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 15, 1994, at 5c
(reporting that small clinics and missions that provide much of health care to Haiti's
more than six million people were reduced to sending trucks to border of Dominican
Republic to scrounge for high-priced fuel on black market). Only hospitals affiliated
with international relief organizations had a chance of getting any fuel sanctioned for
humanitarian relief. Id.
369. William Coch, Henry Macler, Ken Van Dine, Letter to the Editor: In Haiti, Oil
Embargo Increases Suffering, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1994, at A26. A twelve member Ameri-
can medical team who had just returned from Haiti, wrote:
We observed a drastic reduction in medical and preventative health services
provided to rural Haitians. Compared with January 1993, attendance at rural
illness clinics is down 70 percent, surgical cases in regional hospitals are down
75 percent, and the number of immunizations and family planning services
dispensed has similarly declined. Public transportation . . . has declined
nearly 85 percent, and the cost has increased 500 percent, beyond the reach of
most Haitians. The oil embargo is a defacto embargo on medical and prevent-
ative health care for rural Haiti .... The oil embargo is a defacto food em-
bargo for rural Haiti.
Id. See ThePress Release, supra note 355 (stating that PAC humanitarian fuel programme
was backbone of humanitarian operations in Haiti because the program allowed agen-
cies and NGOs to distribute necessary suplies).
370. The Press Release, supra note 355.
371. See THE REPORT, supra note 239, at 12-13 (discussing impact of oil embargo on
provision of medical and preventive health care in rural areas).
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olution 917 also came to include spare parts for trucks, 72 fur-
ther hampering the delivery of supplies. 3  Due to the special
measures needed to transport supplies from Miami and the Do-
minican Republic, the cost of those supplies necessarily in-
creased.
3 74
The financial embargo also impeded the humanitarian
assistance program.3 75 The U.S. Department of the Treasury did
not allow NGOs and agencies with bank accounts in the United
States to send funds to Haiti via checkA76 The only way to get
money into the country was by wire transfer.3 77
Security became a growing concern, particularly during the
summer of 1994.378 Because of the lack of security outside the
major cities, few of the Specialized Agencies undertook field
trips to monitor the situation.3 7 ' Road conditions deteriorated,
preventing NGOs from functioning in the provinces, particularly
the extremely poor Northwest province. 80
Shortly after the adoption of Resolution 841, the nascent
Department of Humanitarian Affairs had not yet formulated a
372. See S.C. Res. 917, supra note 3, 7 (stating that Member States should prevent
the sale of any commodities or products to Haiti or Haitian national or any person or
body carrying on business in Haiti).
373. See Douglas Farah, Haiti's Tiny Victims: As Embargo Tightens, Hospital in Slum is
Crowded with Malnourished Babies, WASH. PosT, June 30, 1994, at Al, A26 (quoting Hai-
tian businesswoman discussing lack of medical supplies due to absence of transporta-
tion).
374. Rapport sur la Situation de lAide Humanitaire, supra note 360, at 3. By the end
of May the United Nations Development Program estimated that transportation costs
alone would increase from 15% to 30% of the value of the imports. Id. The Report on
the Status of Humanitarian Assistance in Haiti warned that the DHA needed to inter-
vene to provide the necessary additional funds. Id. Of the estimated U.S.$62,727,000
needed for the implementation of the assistance program, the Specialized Agencies
had only received a total of U.S.$9,579,565 as of May 20, 1994. Id.
375. See Letter from R. Richard Newcomb, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Con-
trol, U.S. Department of the Treasury (July 27, 1994) (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal) (outlining procedures adopted by the U.S. Treasury's Office of For-
eign Assets Control ("OFAC") in light of financial embargo). A Haitian NGO with a
bank account in the United States was given an OFAC registration number to allow it to
draw funds from its U.S. account. Id. Without the registration number U.S. banks
would reject the NGO's request, due to the financial sanctions imposed on Haiti. Id.
376. Id. The checks were "subject to misuse in the secondary marketplace in Ha-
iti." Id.
377. Id.
378. Rapport sur La Situation de l'Aide Humanitaire, supra note 360, at 2.
379. Id.
380. Neuf ONG Arritent de Fonctionner, LE NOUVELLISTE, March 29, 1994, at 12.
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policy to coordinate the Specialized Agencies. 81 The Special-
ized Agencies had a hard time getting financing for their hu-
manitarian assistance programs.3 82 Moreover, bilateral donors
controlled the humanitarian contributions of their governments
and impacted Specialized Agencies' humanitarian work in Haiti
by conditioning the governments' donations to the Specialized
Agencies.383
Finally, the large relief agencies and specialized agencies
had less trouble getting exemptions than did small relief groups
who do most of their work outside of Port-au-Prince."8 4 A small
U.S. based relief group for instance, needed the consent of the
State Department and of OFAC to charter a plane to bring in
supplies.3 8 5 The Treasury Department application for exemp-
tions was ten pages long and took up to six weeks to process.
3 8 6
2. Health Effects
The general health of the Haitian population suffered as a
result of the U.N. sanctions.387 Sanctions particularly impacted
women and children, traditionally vulnerable groups.3 88
Although medical supplies and foodstuffs were exempt from the
embargo, the lack of fuel in particular contributed to the decline
in health, by curtailing the distribution of food and vaccination
381. THE REPORT, supra note 239, at 22.
382. See Rapport sur La Situation de l'Aide Humanitaire, supra note 360, at 1, 3 (re-
questing that Department of Humanitarian Affairs help Specialized Agencies get
funds).
383. THE REPORT, supra note 239, at 22.
384. See Johnson, supra note 356 (reporting on small relief agencies overcoming
bureaucratic obstacles in United States to bring medical supplies to Haiti during em-
bargo).
385. See id. (reporting that U.S. charter plane companies refused to fly supplies
into Haiti without approval of U.S. State Department and OFAG).
386. Id.
387. See USAID, HAITI: MONITORING REPORT MARCH 1994, at 4-6 (reporting on
high malnutrition, morbidity, and low birthweight levels among Haitian pre-school chil-
dren between 1992 and 1994); see also Pan American Health Organization & World
Health Organization, HAITI: HEALTH SITUATION ANALYSIS 1994 SUMMARY, 1 (1994)
[hereinafter 1994 PAHO REPORT] (observing that Haiti's deteriorated health situation
worsened considerably between 1991 and imposition of sanctions by OAS and United
Nations). Between 1991 and 1994 access to health services declined considerably be-
cause of the embargoes. Id. at 4.
388. See 1994 PAHO REPORT, supra note 387, at 3 (observing that sanctions con-
tributed to further deterioration of children's nutritional environment and that
mothers had to intensify activities outside the home, compromising child care and feed-
ing practices).
1997] U.N. SANCTIONS IN HAITI 1937
programs. 8 9 Malnutrition and epidemics became predominant
problems.39 °
The absence of certain seeds, 91 the increased price of fertil-
izers,3 1  and higher transportation costs raised the price of
food.393 The food programs394 also ruined a number of Haitian
farmers by providing free food at times of high agricultural pro-
ductivity.39 5 In its monthly monitoring reports, USAID reported,
if not an increase in the food supply in most of Haiti,3 96 a normal
production level in certain regions.3 9 7 While crops were avail-
able, these crops perished because there was no transportation
to get them to the markets.3 98 Doctors noticed an increase in
389. See Coch, Macler, Van Dine, supra note 369 and accompanying text (writing
that oil embargo created defacto embargo on medical and preventive health care and de
facto food embargo); see Testimony of David Rogers, Regional Manager Latin America CARE
Before Senate Foreign Relations Comm., Mar. 8, 1994 (describing problems and logistics of
CARE's feeding program). Mr. Rogers testified that:
since the start of the embargo last November, CARE has needed to expand its
food assistance program . . . . In January 1992, CARE's food programs
targeted 20,000 people. Now just two years later, CARE's plan calls for the
distribution of daily supplemental food to 620,000; i.e., 300,000 in a regular
program for nutritionally vulnerable and an additional 320,000 at risk because
of the present emergency situation .... Since the fuel embargo began in
November, CARE staff have worked tirelessly to overcome the logistical and
administrative problems involved in transporting vast quantities of food in the
absence of readily available fuel, spare parts, a functioning infrastructure, and
security. Despite their best efforts, food piled up on the docks in Port-Au-
Prince while the CARE warehouses in the Northwest came dangerously close
to empty.
Id.
390. See 1994 PAHO REPORT, supra note 387, at 2 (observing that health situation
in Haiti between 1991 and 1994 was characterized by rapid increase in numerous
epidemics as result of low immunization coverage, lack of other preventive care, and by
deterioration of nutritional levels and general standards of living).
391. HAITI: MONITORING REPORT OCTOBER 1994, supra note 72, at 7 (1994).
392. Id.
393. See USAID, HAITI: MONITORING REPORTJANUARY 1994, at 6 (1994) (reporting
that between December 1992 and December 1993 price of food increased seventy per-
cent in Port-au-Prince markets, fifty-two percent in Northern markets, and fifty-six per-
cent in Southern markets).
394. See supra notes 355 and 389 and accompanying text (discussing NGO food
programs and logistics).
395. La Paysannerie Haitienne entre la Ruine et l'Exode, LE NOUVELLISTE, Aug. 18,
1994, at 1.
396. See HAITI: MONITORING REPORT JANUARY 1994, supra note 393, at 7 (observing
that stocks of locally produced staples continued to increase in early 1994).
397. See HAITI: MONITORING REPORT OCTOBER 1994, supra note 72, at 7 (reporting
that growth of food crops in southern Haiti was normal).
398. HAITI: MONITORING REPORT JANUARY 1994, supra note 393, at 7.
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the number of malnourishment cases, particularly of infants. 99
The lack of refrigeration for vaccination serums and the
high cost of and absence of transportation to the immunization
centers interrupted the immunization programs. 400 A measles
epidemic swept through Haiti from July 1991 to the end of 1993,
and doctors directly attributed the epidemic to low immuniza-
tion coverage.40 1 The lack of potable water that trucks usually
transported also endangered the population's health.402
The political and diplomatic isolation of the defacto regime
called for by the sanctions marginalized the Ministry of Health,
exacerbating the effect of the embargoes.40 3 Because no Haitian
government prior to the U.N. sanctions had invested in a social
infrastructure,0 4 bilateral and multilateral agencies, churches,
and NGOs provided the bulk of Haiti's health care both before
and during the sanctions.405 The decentralized nature of Haiti's
health system may have mitigated the impact of the sanctions
and prevented the system's total collapse.40 6
399. USAID, HAITI: MONITORING REPORT DECEMBER 1994/JANuARY 1995, at 11. In
the December 1994/January 1995 report, USAID recorded the highest level of severely
malnourished children in nearly four years of reporting. Id.
400. See Mathilde Flambert, Le Cadre Socio-Economique, in Participation de la R~pub-
lique d'Haiti i la Consultation R~gionale sur les Enfants Affect~s par le Conflit Arme at
les Embargos Economiques, IMPACT DE L'EMRARGO ECONOMIQUE SUR LES ENFANTS
o'HAITI, 3 (1996) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (discussing lack of
potable water and of refrigeration of vaccinations serums due to absence of fuel).
401. 1994 PAHO REPORT, supra note 387, at 2.
402. Flambert, supra note 400, at 3. See 1994 PAHO REPORT, supra note 387, at 6
(reporting that by 1994, 37% of Haitians living in Port-au-Prince and 23% of Haitians
living in rural areas had access to potable water).
403. Inter-American Development Bank, HAMTI: EMERGENCY ECONOMIC RECOVERY
PROGRAM, REPORT OF THE JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION, 58 (1994) [hereinafter EERP RE-
PORT]. Although 50% to 60% of health services in Haiti are provided by NGOS, the
marginalization seriously affected regions, such as the Grande Anse, the South and the
South-East Dipartements, with high percentages of public health institutions in relation
to NGO and mixed health services. THE REPORT, supra note 239, at 12. Public health
facilities represented 55% of Grande Anse's total health facilities, 53% of the South's
total health facilities and 67% of the South-East's total facilities. Id. The withdrawal of
international assistance to the public health sector worsened already weak public health
facilities. Id. Some public health facilities eventually closed down for lack of staff and
medications. Id.
404. See UNICEF, Analyse de la Situation des Femmes et des Enfants en Haiti (Periode
1980-1993), 80-88 (1994) (discussing ultra-centralized Duvalier regime which virtually
ignored basic needs of rural areas).
405. See THE REPORT, supra note 239, at 12 (reporting that during embargo
amount of aid channeled through NGOs increased).
406. Id. at 13.
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3. Environmental Effects
Preliminary figures indicate that the OAS and U.N. sanc-
tions may have had a considerable impact on Haiti's environ-
ment.40 7 The consumption of wood for fuels increased eight
percent between 1991 and 1992."8 Charcoal consumption in-
creased eighteen and a half percent during the same time pe-
riod.4 0 9 Wood for charcoal production substituted for the lack
of fuel and gas for cooking and also represented an additional
source of income."' The extensive logging contributed to the
erosion of the soil, 411 the clogging of irrigation systems, 4 12 and
eventually the disappearance of entire ecosystems.413
4. Economic Effects
The embargo had a number of repercussions on the Hai-
tian economy and various economic actors.414 For the wealthy
Haitian elite, the U.N. sanctions presented at most an inconven-
ience.41 For black marketeers the sanctions represented a series
of business opportunities.4 16 Sanctions impacted most heavily
the vast majority of Haitians living at subsistence levels.41 7
A heavily hit sector of the economy was the assembly sec-
407. Id. at 15.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Des Spicialistes du PNUD Ont Dinonci la Digradation Catastrophique de
l'Environnement (Radio M~tropole, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Oct. 21, 1994).
412. Id.
413. Id. Experts estimate that the environmental damage caused by the embargo
will require US$100 million to prevent any further degradation. Id.
414. See LEs NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 5 (stating that sanctions
impoverished Haitian middle class and created new class of wealthy black marketeers);
see supra note 335 (discussing US$900 million international community contributed to
Haiti to jump start Haitian economy following lifting of sanctions in 1995).
415. See Kenneth Freed, For Haiti's Wealthy, Crackdown Hasn't Ended Good Life, L.A
TIMES, June 28, 1994, at A8 (reporting that despite comprehensive sanctions wealthy,
Haitians continue to live well in Haiti by circumventing sanctions and using black mar-
ket).
416. See Kathie Klarreich, Haiti Embargo Hits Middle Class; Elite Exploits Black Market,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Aug. 1, 1994, at 3 (describing how members of Haitian elite
made millions of dollars on black market).
417. See Kathie Klarreich, Haitians Focus on Daily Struggle, CHRITIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Sept. 1, 1994, at 6 (observing how tripling price of transportation, rapid decline of
Haitian Gourde, increase in price of food staples severely impacted lives of seven mil-
lion Haitians).
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tor.4 18 Although under the OAS sanctions the United States al-
lowed the 807 company419 sector to continue operating, the
U.N. sanctions prevented them from doing so. 42 1 In addition,
the United Nations and the European Union estimated that Ha-
iti lost over US$41 million in exports of agricultural products
due to the embargo.421
Overall unemployment in 1994 rose to eighty percent.
422
Between May and August 1994, fifty thousand inhabitants of
Port-au-Prince lost theirjobs. 42 These repercussions of the em-
bargo were especially far-reaching because business groups esti-
mate that eight people rely on each salary.4 2 4 Unions became
superfluous and collective bargaining non-existent, as employers
set wages unilaterally.425 At most, the unions would keep track
of their members and eventually provide limited assistance.4 26
On a macro-economic policy level, inflation skyrocketed by
August of 1994, when the Central Bank expanded the money
supply with no hard currency to back it up, devaluating the Hai-
tian Gourde by forty percent.427 The devaluation led to an in-
creased dollarization of the economy with the U.S. Dollar be-
coming the central currency. 428  Consumer prices increased by
418. See EERP, supra note 403, at 22 (1994) (reporting that of 252 firms existing in
1990 in assembly sector, only 44 were operating by November 1994).
419. See Testimony of Donna Hrinack, supra note 238 (testifying as to why United
States allowed 807 companies to continue their business in Haiti despite embargo).
420. Laurent Belsie, Opportunity Knocks: Some US Firms Greet End to Haiti Embargo,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONrrOR, Sept. 27, 1994, at 3. At their peak, the assembly companies,
which were primarily American, employed some 100,000 Haitians. Id. Other sources
quote a more conservative estimate of 46,000. EERP REPORT, supra note 403, at 22.
The loss of income from the assembly sector contributed to a fall in gross domestic
product from US$2.2 billion in 1991 to US$1.9 billion in 1993. Canute James, Haitians
Try to Bring Tattered Economy Back from the Dead, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1995, at 4.
421. Haiti Tries to Avert $$$ Crisis, Associated Press, Aug. 29, 1994. Haiti lost US$15
million in exports of coffee and cocoa, US$14 million in essential oils, and US$12 mil-
lion in mangos. Id.
422. Douglas Farah, Embargo has Haiti's Economy Near Collapse, but the Rulers Stand
Firm, WASH. PosT, Aug. 26, 1994, at A20.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994, at
429-430 (1995).
426. Id.
427. Embargo has Haiti's Economy Near Collapse, supra note 422 at A20.
428. See id. (reporting that de facto government ordered all businesses to post
prices in Haitian currency and not dollars to slow dollarization of Haitian economy and
threatened to take legal action against business that did not follow orders).
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almost fifty percent in 1993, which, combined with diminishing
employment opportunities, made real wages fall by nearly a
third.4 2 9 Remittances from abroad had provided approximately
US$240 million before the United States imposed limits of
US$50 per month.430
Due to the oil embargo, the status of multinational oil com-
panies became precarious.431 Other repercussions of the em-
bargo included the emergence of a black market for fuel smug-
gled over the border shared with the Dominican Republic. 432
While the price of gasoline hovered around eight dollars a gal-
lon in 1994, the price in Haitian gourdes doubled due to the
429. Inter-American Development Bank, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN LATIN
AMERICA 1994 SPECIAL REPORT: FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, 106 (1994).
430. Embargo has Haiti's Economy Near Colcipse, supra note 422 at A20.
431. See Allyson LaBorde, Oil Firms' Experience in Haiti Shows Squeeze of Conflicting
Mandates, PLATrr'S OILGRAM NEWS, Nov. 30, 1993, at 2 (reporting that situation Esso,
Texaco, and Shell found themselves in during oil embargo illustrated difficulties inter-
national companies faced in U.N. embargo). The three oil companies operating in Ha-
iti before and during oil embargo were Exxon Corporation's subsidiary, Esso, Texaco,
and Shell. Id. The imposition of the oil embargo by the Security Council presented
less of an economic hassle to the oil companies than it did a political one. See id. (ob-
serving that quantities of petroleum and petroleum products those three oil companies
imported into Haiti were infinitesimal relative to their total market). Following the
reinstatement of the oil embargo by the Security Council on October 18, 1993, Haiti's
National Association of Petroleum Products Distributors filed suit in a Haitian court
against Shell, Texaco, and Esso after the companies decided to withhold supplies begin-
ning October 21 pursuant to Resolutions 875 and 841. Id. On November 10, Shell Oil
announced from its office in Houston that it refused to abide by the order from Haitian
judicial authorities to resume gasoline sales, and justified its decision by claiming it was
complying with the U.N. imposed embargo. Courts Deny Shell Recourse (Agence France
Presse Broadcast, Paris, Nov. 14, 1993). On November 11 th, 1993, the presidingjudge,
Judge Henock Voltaire, stating that the companies operating in Haiti must follow Hai-
tian laws, ordered the three companies to resume distribution of reserves. Id. On No-
vember 13, Shell filed a recourse in the Haitian Court of Appeals, which was denied, to
exclude itself from the mandatory distribution of its fuel. Id. On November 15 and 18,
Haitian authorities forced the release of fuel and the oil companies' situation became
ambiguous. LaBorde, supra note 431. Employees of the oil companies could be jailed
in Haiti for violating Haitian laws by refusing to obey the court order. Id. The United
Nations could not clarify whether the companies were in violation of the embargo. Id.
A spokesperson for the U.N. Secretary General said the oil companies took the sanc-
tions one step further than required by not releasing supplies on the island. Id. Reso-
lution provisions only banned imports. Id. Legal scholars asserted that, in the immedi-
ate sense, companies operating in Haiti have no choice but to follow Haitian laws. Id.
Only if the defacto government appropridted stocks would the home countries have a
claim against Haiti in the realm of international law. Id..
432. Howard W. French, Embargo Creates "Oil Boom" near Haitian Border, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 1994, at 3; Katie Klarreich, Haitians get Around U.N. Sanctions via Dominican
Border, CHRISTAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 16, 1993, at 1.
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devaluation of the Haitian Gourde.413 The diplomatic commu-
nity found itself buying all of its fuel on the black market.41 4
Many Haitians turned to the cross-border gasoline trade since it
was the only viable economic activity remaining.435 Coupled
with inflated prices for seeds, the potential profits of the black
markets were too big a lure for many peasants living near the
border.436 They traded with herdsmen living near the border in
the Dominican Republic who used to be involved in the illegal
smuggling of sugar.43 7
The Haitian military benefited immensely from the cross-
border smuggling and the black market for fuel.43 8 The military
initially left the oil trade alone.43 9 When, however, the military
learned of the potential profits in the black market in November
of 1993, it then commandeered supplies and divided them
among military officers to sell on the black market." 0 The com-
manding officers were the primary beneficiaries of the profits
from the sale of fuel on the black market, and had their own
network based on the sale of contraband and extortion. 44
Because the Dominican Republic was the primary source of
fuel sold on the Haitian black markets during the embargo, the
international community tried to shut the Haitian-Dominican
Republic border down or set up a better monitoring mecha-
433. Embargo has Haiti's Economy Near Collapse, supra note 422.
434. See Kathie Klarreich, US Forced to Break Fuel Embargo in Haiti, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 25, 1994, at 7 (reporting that United States had been breaking oil em-
bargo since 1993 by buying fuel on black market for embassy cars and generators).
435. French, supra note 432, at 3.
436. Les Paysans se Convertissent en Vendeurs de 'gaz', LE NOUVELLISrE, Mar. 23-24,
1994, at 3.
437. Id.
438. See Embargo Has Haiti's Economy Near Collapse, supra note 422, at A20 (report-
ing that Haitian army was once economically dependent on Haitian elite for income
but because of black market developed own financial backing and became independent
of elite); see also LFs NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 5 (observing that black
marketeers used financial gains to buy support).
439. Haitians Get Around U.N. Sanctions via Dominican Border, supra note 432.
440. See Testimony of Michael R Wiest, Deputy Executive Director of Catholic Relief Services
Before the House Foreign Relations Comm., (February 9, 1994) (testifying that "high ranking
military and police officers targeted by the international embargo, by all accounts, are
reaping enormous economic benefits from the distortions to the economy that the
sanctions are causing").
441. See Embargo Has Haiti's Economy Near Collapse, supra note 422, at A20
(reporting that military developed its own financial network based on extortion and
contraband).
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nism.142 Getting the Dominican Republic to recognize and co-
operate with the embargo was difficult.443 President Aristide had
alienated the Dominican Republic in the early 1990s by criticiz-
ing the Dominican Republic's exploitation of Haitian labor and
as result was widely disliked in the Dominican Republic.'"
Moreover, the Haitian and Dominican armies have a history dat-
ing from the 19th century, of cooperating in smuggling ven-
tures. 45 Military budget cutbacks in the Dominican Republic
made the lucrative border trade all the more appealing to the
Dominican Republic's military.4"
5. Social Impact
The U.N. sanctions both drew on and furthered Haiti's eco-
nomic and social disparities." 7 For the elite, the embargoes sim-
ply represented an inconvenience, even when directly targeted
at them." Smuggling prevailed and the elite continued to get
whatever it needed.44 9 Members of the elite also made money
off of the black markets.45 °
442. See Accord for Patrols on Border of Haiti, Iwr'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 3, 1994 (re-
lease compiled by INT'L HERALD TRIB. staff members) (reporting that United States and
Dominican Republic had reached agreement for 88 member force to patrol Haitian-
Dominican border to prevent smuggling of fuel from Dominican Republic); see also LES
NATIONS UNIES ET HAri, supra note 4, at 4 (mentioning force set up to monitor Haitian-
Dominican border).
443. See Robert S. Greenberger, U.S. Policy on Haiti may be Affected by Recent Vote in
Dominican Republic, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1994, at A9 (reporting on Dominican Repub-
lic's lack of cooperation).
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. See LEs NATIONS UNIES ET HAITI, supra note 4, at 5 (observing that sanctions
impoverished Haitian middle class and brought about new class of black marketeers);
see also notes 171 to 213 and accompanying text (detailing history of Haitian class rival-
ties).
448. See Freed, supra note 415, at A8 (describing impact of sanctions on targeted
wealthy Haitians). One businessman close to the military said: "We are not idiots. We
were told months in advance they were going to freeze our assets. If people didn't see
the writing on the wall, well, they deserve to lose what they have." Haiti Embargo Hits
Middle Class; Elite Exploits Black Market, supra note 416, at 3.
449. See Haiti Embargo Hits Middle Class; Elite Exploits Black Market, supra note 416, at
3 (reporting that goods flowed accross border from Dominican Republic to supply elite
and eventually to permit them to resell products on black market). A U.S. official said
in August 1994: "The only people who can weather this [the inflation and the impact of
the sanctions] are the true elite." Embargo has Haiti's Economy Near Collapse, but the Rulers
Stand Firm, supra note 422, at A20.
450. Haiti Embargo Hits Middle Class; Elite Exploits Black Market; supra note 416, at 3
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The effect of the sanctions on the middle class was much
more severe than the effect on the elite.4 51 Small entrepreneurs
first found themselves having to close factories because the price
of fuel on the black market got too expensive.452 Engines and
generators were irreparable due to a lack of spare parts.455 The
income of members of the middle class who relied on their rela-
tives' remittances decreased. 454
Education in Haiti suffered due to the sanctions.4 55 In
1994, twenty-five percent of adult Haitian men and thirty-six
percent of adult Haitian women had had no education whatso-
ever.456 Moreover, a study of the sanctions imposed on Cuba
found that higher levels of education and social cohesion en-
sured that there was news of where to find limited goods, illus-
trating the need for education especially during an embargo.457
The lack of public transportation and gasoline for cars pre-
vented children from going to school.4 5 8 As sanctions wore on,
parents kept children at home because they were unable to pay
the tuition. 459  From January to September of 1994, Haiti's
schools were open for a total of five months, due to the turmoil
caused by the sanctions.46 By 1996, only fifty-seven percent of
Haitian children were enrolled in school, illustrating the long
term impact of the sanctions.4 1
Sanctions severely impacted Haiti's peasantry.462 The em-
(reporting that many members of Haitian elite made money on black market by hord-
ing products and then releasing them on black market at inflated prices).
451. Haiti Embargo Hits Middle Class; Elite Exploits Black Market, supra note 416, at 3.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. See Howard W. French, Even Wealthy Haitians Starting to Feel Pinched, N.Y.
TIMEsJune 11, 1994, at 6 (reporting that due to financial embargo, estimated US$200
million to US$300 million in remittances sent to Haiti by Haitians living abroad,
stopped, thereby eliminating substantial part of Haitians' income). Economists said
remittances and funds from sale of cocaine had kept Haitian economy afloat since the
1991 coup. Id.
455. Flambert, supra note 400, at 3-4.
456. Symposium National, supra note 174, at 5.
457. Richard Garfield, Address at the Harvard University Conference on Human
Rights and Sanctions (Sept. 22, 1994).
458. Flambert, supra note 400, at 3-4.
459. Id. at 4.
460. Garry Pierre-Pierre, Turmoil in Haiti Dims Future of its Students, N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 1994, at B7.
461. Flambert, supra note 400, at 4.
462. Howard French, As Sanctions Bite, Haiti's Poor Feel the Pinch, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
15, 1993, at A7.
U.N. SANCTIONS IN HAITI
bargo prevented the export of Haitian farmed goods such as cof-
fee, cacao, and mangoes, ruining farmers.463 Some sold their
animals and eventually their plots of land and attempted to emi-
grate either to the cities, further overburdening an already weak
urban infrastructure, or eventually to Florida.464 The food distri-
bution programs came at times when there was enough local
food being produced in certain regions.465 Not only did the pro-
grams raise the occurrence of welfare dependency but they also
sent many farmers into ruin by drastically lowering the price of
their products. 466 During the time the. sanctions were in effect,
the United Nations invested a tremendous amount of money in
lessening the pain it was inflicting on the populations of the
targeted countries.467
III. ANALYSIS AD FIADINGS
Sanctions typically do not impose enough of a cost on the
targeted group for them to matter.468 In an era of strong trade
relations, economic sanctions can become more effective. There
is a considerable gap between the use and definition of sanctions
in treatises and the use of them in reality.469 This is mostly due
to the implementation and enforcement of sanctions, which in
Haiti's case fluctuated from a naval blockade by the United
States470 to complete disregard of the embargo and the well-pub-
licized continuation of trade over the Dominican Republic bor-
der.4 71
463. La Paysannerie Haitienne entre la Ruine et l'Exode, supra note 355, 1. Coffee and
cacao exports totalled US$15 million per year prior to the embargo, oils totaled US$14
million, and mangoes totalled US$12 million. Id.
464. Id. Thirty-seven percent of peasants had debts of US$70 or more and only
had an annual income of US$262 in 1992. Id. at 8.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Paul Lewis, UN. is Worried by Human Cost of Embargoes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,
1994. U.N. members have disbursed more than US$800 million a year to mitigate the
pain of sanctions on Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Haiti. Id.
468. See supra notes 448 and 450 and accompanying text (discussing minor impact
of sanctions on members of Haitian de facto government and elite relative to rest of
Haitian population).
469. See supra note 108 (discussing lack of uniformity in definition of sanctions,
indicating confusion involved in implementing sanctions).
470. See supra note 284 (setting forth details of naval blockade).
471. See supra note 432 and accompanying text (discussing supply by Dominican
Republic of oil).
19971 1945
1946 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:1878
A. Assessing the Effectiveness of Sanctions in Haiti
Whereas the effectiveness of sanctions by definition will fo-
cus more on the sender country and its policies,472 assessing the
costs of sanctions, if done properly, should focus equally on the
sender and target, eventually emphasizing the impact on the
targeted country's population. Frameworks analyzing the effec-
tiveness and cost of sanctions, however, generally tend to ignore
the social dimension of sanctions.4 73 While effectiveness is a
facet in the study of sanctions, there are other dimensions as
well, such as the social one, which cannot be ignored, particu-
larly in the case of collective sanctions imposed by an interna-
tional or regional organization that also has duties to uphold
rights and encourage social and economic development.4 74 The
social costs, however, are hard to assess and, for that reason,
have rarely been factored in as variables when calculating the
effectiveness of a sanctions episode.
Particularly in donor-dependent and poor countries, the im-
pact of sanctions, such as an embargo on aid, on the majority of
the population can be drastic, as was the case of Haiti.47 5 In in-
stances where the objective is to undermine the credibility of the
targeted state's government, the sanctions can have repercus-
sions on the majority of the population.476 Some of the best tes-
timony regarding the impact of sanctions comes less from econo-
mists, trade experts, and policy makers, but rather from non-gov-
ernmental organizations, 77 field offices of international
organizations, 478 doctors and other field workers. 479 Their testi-
mony illustrates the real impact of the sanctions. Unfortunately
the warnings issued during the hearings and in other forms of
472. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (defining sanctions).
473. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text (setting forth ways to evaluate
effectiveness of sanctions).
474. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing United Nations' man-
date to encourage economic development).
475. See supra notes 335 and 447-67 and accompanying text (discussing impact of
sanctions on target state's population).
476. Id.
477. See, e.g., supra note 389 (quoting testimony by CARE representative on impact
of sanctions on Haitians).
478. See, e.g., supra notes 360, 387, and 404 (citing UNDP, USAID, PAHO, and
UNICEF reports).
479. See supra note 369 and accompanying text (quoting testimony by American
medical team working in Haiti during embargo).
U.N. SANCTIONS IN HAITI
testimony480 as to the consequences of prolonging sanctions had
little effect on Security Council decisions to extend the embargo
against Haiti.4"'
Collective sanctions, whether imposed through a regional
organization or the United Nations, are harder to enforce than
unilateral sanctions for a number of reasons. The United Na-
tions can only authorize sanctions,482 but its Member States must
implement them.4 3 The burden of enforcement and imple-
mentation can fall unequally on some countries, particularly
those with strong trading or financial ties,484 those dependent
on one commodity provided by the targeted state, or eventually
countries neighboring the targeted state.485 Furthermore, the
Sanctions Committees have met behind closed doors, and have
not made the content of their meetings available to the media
which could eventually help keep violators of sanctions in
check.486
Another problem confronting the United Nations with re-
gard to the enforcement and implementation of sanctions con-
cerns multinational corporations. The problem stems from the
confusion surrounding the status of multinationals and their
subsidiaries as to which government regulates which segment of
the multinational, particularly for companies operating within
the targeted state.4 8 7 The United Nations cannot penalize mul-
tinationals for violating the sanctions if multinationals are work-
ing within the legal bounds established by the domestic law of
the targeted countries. 88 Accordingly, the United Nations must
480. See supra notes 369, and 387-89 and accompanying text (reporting on drastic
impact of sanctions).
481. See supra note 346 (quoting debate following adoption of Resolution 917).
482. See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text (discussing United Nations'
ability to adopt resolutions calling for sanctions against Member State).
483. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text (setting forth obligation by
Member States to implement and enforce sanctions called for by United Nations).
484. See supra notes 432-37 and accompanying text (analyzing Dominican Repub-
lic's trading relationship with Haiti).
485. See, e.g., supra notes 442-46 (debating role of Dominican Republic in enforce-
ment of sanctions against Haiti).
486. See supra note 307 (discussing why Sanctions Committees meet behind closed
doors).
487. See supra note 431 and accompanying text (setting forth problems faced by oil
companies operating in Haiti during embargo).
488. See id. (discussing United Nations' inability to penalize multinationals for ob-
serving law because multinationals are non-state actors that fall outside purview of
United Nations system).
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be more aware of multinational corporations operating in the
targeted country during a sanctions episode. Furthermore, the
United Nations cannotjust assume that implementation and en-
forcement measures undertaken by Member States will provide
sufficient protection for those multinationals.
The United States had a particularly thorough framework in
which to implement sanctions.489 Other countries did not,490 es-
pecially the Dominican Republic, which time and again violated
the U.N. resolutions by supplying Haiti's black markets with
fuel. 491 The issue brings to light the problems the United Na-
tions faces when trying to enforce the Charter, because the
United Nations' only remedies are political. Even if an issue
were brought to the ICJ492 and the parties did not comply with
the Court's decision pursuant to Article 94(1), 9 they still have
recourse to the Security Council under Article 94(2).' 9'
A number of problems confronted the OAS sanctions from
their inception. 495 The sanctions as drawn up by the OAS were
meant as short-term policy instruments because their impact on
the Haitian economy was known to be quite substantial. From
October of 1991 to June of 1993, when the United Nations Se-
curity Council imposed sanctions, the OAS sanctions became
progressively less effective as a means to reach a solution.4 9 6
Sanctions were not properly targeted and were hurting the
wrong segments of the population.4 97 The decision of the Minis-
ters' of Foreign Affairs of the OAS to shift the burden of finding,
489. See supra note 166 (setting forth U.S. legal framework used to implement
sanctions).
490. See supra note 137 (stating that there are differences among Member States'
implementation mechanisms).
491. See supra notes 432-46 and accompanying text (reporting on black market
trade over Dominican Republic border).
492. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (outlining role of International
Court of Justice).
493. See supra note 134 (citing Article 94 of U.N. Charter).
494. Id.
495. See supra notes 234-37 (discussing limitations of sanctions imposed by regional
organization).
496. Id.; see, e.g., supra note 238 (quoting testimony by U.S. Assistant Secretary for
Caribbean and Mexican Affairs as to reasons why United States decided to stop observ-
ing OAS sanctions and allow 807 companies to continue manufacturing in Haiti).
497. See supra notes 418-26 (analyzing impact embargo was having on Haitian
workers).
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a solution on to the Security Council498 best illustrates the failure
of OAS and U.N. General Assembly resolutions. The General
Assembly Resolutions mimicked those of the OAS4 9 9 and served
only to expand the number of the states imposing sanctions on
Haiti. The failure of both the OAS and the General Assembly
resolutions to achieve a resolution to the Haitian crisis illustrate
the inherent weaknesses of the two institutions. The OAS and
the General Assembly are not able to play a central role in a
sanctions episode because they are constrained by the voluntary
nature of the measures they can impose and because, in the case
of the OAS, of the regional limitations of its membership.
The selective measures 500 had an enormous effect on the
population but little effect on the military authorities. In fact,
the military high-command had cornered the black market for
fuel and was reaping the benefits.50 1 Moreover, the Harlan
County debacle clearly proved to the Haitian military that the
United Nations and the United States were not fully committed
to reinstating Aristide. The selective measures, when not backed
up by the threat of military force, only served to entrench rather
than extract the defacto government.
The oil and arms embargo generally was not a success be-
cause it was poorly thought out and targeted. The embargo im-
peded development and humanitarian assistance,50 2 burdened
the poor by destroying their livelihoood, 0 further jeopardized
the environment,50 4 and unraveled Haiti's weak social fabric. 50 5
In addition, the non-compliance by the Dominican Republic 50 6
498. See supra note 232 (citing OAS resolution calling for more active role for Se-
curity Council).
499. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text (outlining General Assembly
resolutions calling for sanctions against Haiti).
500. See supra notes 251-85 and accompanying text (discussing selective mandatory
measures called for by Security Council).
501. See supra notes 432-41 (analyzing emergence of black market).
502. See supra notes 353-86 and accompanying text (describing impact of embargo
on development and humanitarian assistance).
503. See supra notes 421-30 and 462-66 and accompanying text (outlining impact of
sanctions on farmers and urban employment opportunities).
504. See supra notes 407-13 and accompanying text (describing impact of sanctions
on Haiti's environment).
505. See supra notes 447-66 and accompanying text (setting forth impact of sanc-
tions on Haitian society).
506. See supra notes 442-46 and accompanying text (describing Dominican Repub-
lic's non-compliance with the embargo).
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which was supplying a large amount of Haiti's oil,5 0 7 contributed
to the failure of this set of sanctions. The United Nations ulti-
mately misunderstood how deeply rooted the elite's fear of Arisi-
tide's policies were, and underestimated the power of violence in
Haitian society. The embargo simply compounded rather than
alleviated Haiti's problems.
An anticipated, if unspoken, repercussion of the embargo
was that the population would eventually rise up to overthrow or
call for the overthrow of the military leaders.50 8 Throughout Ha-
iti's two hundred year history, there had never been an opportu-
nity for the majority of Haiti's population to create any sem-
blance of a political network.50 9 The political network available,
consisting primarily of the Catholic church as the population's
voice, was decimated by years of repression by the Duvalier re-
gime and by the political chaos following his overthrow. Those
Haitians who wanted to overthrow the de facto government had
no way of doing it: there was no organization or network avail-
able to undermine the Haitian military. The policy therefore, of
using the sanctions as a tool to incite the population to action
was not a valid or realistic one.
The U.N. monitoring, exemption and oil disbursement sys-
tems also had a number of flaws. 5 10 By trying to adhere to the
measures called for by the Security Council resolutions,5 11 the
Sanctions Committee established guidelines which in theory re-
mained true to the legal framework of the resolutions but which
in reality wreaked havoc among the humanitarian assistance pro-"
grams. The Sanctions Committees are by nature governmental
and not humanitarian and the Committee in charge of monitor-
ing the Haitian sanctions episode did not consider the impact
the sanctions had on humanitarian assistance.
The legal framework in place under the U.N. Charter legis-
lating the use of sanctions is flexible enough to accommodate as
507. See supra note 312 (stating that Dominican Republic supplied estimated 30%
of Haiti's oil supply in 1994).
508. See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 103, at 38 (observing that
one objective of sanctions is to destabilize the regime in place).
509. See supra notes 171-213 and accompanying (discussing Haiti's social and polit-
ical history).
510. See supra notes 368-77 (analyzing problems in exemption and fuel disburse-
ment systems).
511. See supra notes 259 and 290 (listing measures called for by Security Council
Resolutions 841 and 917).
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unique a scenario as Haiti's. The United Nations' weakness,
however, lies in the practical aspects of sanctions, notably their
implementation. As Haiti's case illustrates, the United Nations
was unprepared to properly deal with sanctions.512 While the
U.N. Charter provides for the protection of the sender states
under Article 50, it does not foresee the impact sanctions will
have on the targeted state. Arguably, Article 55 is to targeted
states, what Articles 50 and eventually Article 49 are to sender
states. The United Nations should use Article 55 to direct its
sanctions policy toward targeted states. Article 55 sets out eco-
nomic and social development goals513 that are easily impacted
by sanctions. The sanctions imposed on Haiti did not foster sta-
bility and well-being, nor did they promote higher standards of
living, full employment, economic development, or social pro-
gress. Rather, the sanctions had a reverse effect and required
the international community to intervene following the lifting of
the sanctions and lend over US$200 million to Haiti.514 Had the
United Nations used Article 55 as a guideline, the organization
could have reacted early on to the deleterious effects of the sanc-
tions. Moreover, the institutional framework implementing Arti-
cle 55515 proved to be a much more realistic assessor of the im-
pact of sanctions than the Security Council's Sanctions Commit-
tee. The Specialized Agencies in Haiti worked in the field and
witnessed first hand the effect of the embargoes and the reality
of overcoming bureaucratic obstacles to bring in goods to Haiti
despite the embargo.
A number of general conclusions on the effect of sanctions
can be drawn from Haiti's case. The breakdown or non-exist-
ence of the state exacerbates the effect of an embargo. 516 Haiti
had an impoverished and unhealthy population 517 and had virtu-
512. See supra notes 389 and 467 and accompanying text (discussing the need to
increase humanitarian assistance to Haiti to lessen impact of sanctions on Haitian pop-
ulation).
513. See supra note 22 (citing Article 55 of U.N. Charter).
514. See supra note 414 (reporting on multilateral aid given to Haiti following lift-
ing of sanctions and removal of military government).
515. Supra notes 56 and 72 and accompanying text (describing ECOSOC and Spe-
cialized Agencies that help pursue objectives called for under Article 55).
516. See supra notes 403-4 (describing lack of services provided by Haitian govern-
ment and void filled by non-governmental organizations and Specialized Agencies).
517. See supra note 363 (detailing effect of disintegration of state on development
and humanitarian assistance during embargo).
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ally no social services to mitigate the effects of the sanctions.5 1
The effect of the embargo was poorly distributed, because of
badly targeted sanctions.5 19
An oil embargo is an extreme measure and should be care-
fully thought out before being implemented. The United Na-
tions incorrectly assumed that the majority of Haiti's population
would not be heavily affected by fuel shortages, particularly if
humanitarian assistance programs continued to have enough
fuel.5"' Tying humanitarian fuel into the sanctions program im-
mediately turned humanitarian fuel into a political instrumental-
ity and made it susceptible to misuse by the de facto authori-
ties.521 Secondly, the humanitarian fuel and assistance distribu-
tion network could not meet all needs. Regions where the state
as opposed to NGOs were the primary health care provided
found themselves lagging behind.
In addition, those who planned out the sanctions underesti-
mated the resourcefulness and wealth of the elite in circum-
venting the embargo. Two hundred years of coups d'6tats, upris-
ings, dictators, and absent governments 52 will fine tune the tar-
get's coping mechanisms. The Haitian elite proved time and
again that there are always substitutes for embargoed goods.52 3
The porosity of the Dominican Republic's border, allowed for
fairly easy access to gasoline.52 4 Furthermore, wealthy Haitians
only had to get on a plane and fly to Miami to do their shop-
ping.52 5 The elite also had enough U.S. dollars to buy whatever
else it needed on the black market.5 26
518. See supra notes 171 and 387 (setting forth economic and health status of Hai-
tian population).
519. See supra notes 447-66 and accompanying text (outlining effects of U.N. sanc-
tions on majority of Haitian population).
520. See supra note 314 and accompanying text (describing humanitarian fuel dis-
tribution system).
521. See supra notes 364-67 and accompanying text (discussing use of humanita-
rian fuel by defacto authorities as leverage to gain political legitimacy).
522. See supra notes 171-213 and accompanying text (outlining Haiti's turbulent
social and political history).
523. See supra notes 414, 432-41, and 448-50 and accompanying text (discussing
emergence of black market and success of Haitian elites in avoiding effect of embargo).
524. See supra notes 432-46 and accompanying text (analyzing crossborder trade of
fuel during embargo).
525. See supra notes 448-50 and accompanying text (reporting that sanctions did
not stand in way of wealthy Haitians).
526. See id. (discussing wealthy Haitians circumventing embargo and buying and
selling black market goods).
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Therefore, in order to implement an effective sanctions epi-
sode, the United Nations should have taken into account rele-
vant characteristics of the targeted group and general socio-eco-
nomic inidcators. Such characteristics include the amount of
money and time the elite can expend to circumvent the em-
bargo and the goods and benefits that matter to wealthy Hai-
tians, such as visas to the United States and U.S. bank accounts.
Moreover, the poorer a country, the harder it is to create and
implement an embargo: the poverty of the country also contrib-
utes to the emergence of informal sector substitutes for embar-
goed goods.527 A less developed country tends to have an exten-
sive informal sector, which combined with the resourcefulness of
the local population, would diminish the intended impact of the
sanctions.528 If the country's trading ties are meager or if large
segments of the population are extremely poor, the sanctions
need to be micro-surgically targeted in order to prevent the
wrong segments of the population from getting hurt. The
United Nations needs to analyze the situation before applying
the sanctions, rather than after imposing a general set of sanc-
tions, as in the case of Haiti.
Politically, sanctions may be inexpensive. Although re-
ferred to as foreign policy on the cheap,52 9 sanctions are ex-
tremely expensive economically to the sender countries, the
targeted country, and eventually the United Nations.55 ° In Ha-
iti's case, the sanctions hastened the destruction of Haiti's econ-
omy,5 3 1 impeded the humanitarian assistance programs, 53 2 cre-
ated economic refugees 53 and jeopardized human lives.531
527. See, e.g., supra notes 437 and 445 (illustrating how black market in Haiti built
itself up during embargo on existing network of informal sector).
528. Id.
529. See supra note 104 (refering to sanctions as popular policy tool because of low
costs to sender states).
530. See supra note 467 (reporting on payments by United nations to mitigate im-
pact of sanctions).
531. See supra notes 414-32 and accompanying text (setting forth effects of sanc-
tions on Haitian economy).
532. See supra notes 353-86 and accompanying text (analyzing effects of embargo
on humanitarian assistance programs).
533. SeeJones, supra note 258 (positing that refugees fleeing from Haiti were con-
sidered primarily as economic refugees and therefore were not granted political asy-
lum).
534. See supa notes 387-90 and 400-2 and accompanying text (analyzing effect of
embargo on health programs).
19971 1953
1954 FORDHAMINTERATATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:1878
It is crucial when imposing multi-tiered sanctions, to keep
the humanitarian assistance as a separate entity. The single big-
gest avoidable mistake the United Nations made was to turn hu-
manitarian assistance into a political instrumentality.535  By
politicizing humanitarian assistance, donors and the United Na-
tions eliminated the appearance of neutrality, and eventually im-
peded the assistance programs.5 3 6 Particularly in a circumstance
such as Haiti, where the international community was trying to
isolate the de facto regime diplomatically, 3 7 the United Nations
should have recognized the hazards that lay ahead, and the im-
portance of maintaining a neutral and impartial assistance pro-
gram. When trying to gain international recognition, the defacto
authorities tried every means available, including denying ex-
emptions,538 even on humanitarian grounds. The larger issue
would be whether the degree of diplomatic isolation was neces-
sary in Haiti's case. Former President Carter, who had become a
recognized expert on negotiating with pariah regimes,539 was
sent down to Haiti to negotiate with the military triumvirate, be-
cause the international community had effectively severed all
political and diplomatic ties with the regime,54 ° thereby eliminat-
ing any basis on which to reach a settlement. Therefore, the
United Nations should take the lesson to heart, that before it
diplomatically and politically isolates a renegade regime, the or-
ganization should ensure that the humanitarian assistance pro-
grams be fully protected from the political aspects of the sanc-
tions episode. 1i
The immediate purpose of the sanctions in Haiti was to
make the military triumvirate step down.5 4 1 Undoubtedly, sanc-
tions were not the right tools to use in Haiti's case. A surgical
535. See supra notes 364-67 and accompanying text (detailing use of humanitarian
fuel by defacto Haitian authorities to gain diplomatic recognition).
536. See supra note 362 (positing that witholding of humanitarian aid by interna-
tional community to defacto government ministries destroyed appearance of neutrality
of humanitarian assistance).
537. See supra note 241 (arguing that one of objectives of sanctions in Haiti was to
isolate and delegitimize de facto government).
538. See supra note 365 (discussing withholding of tax exemptions by defacto gov-
ernment in order to gain recognition).
539. See supra note 8 (listing regimes former President Carter had negotiated
with).
540. See supra note 241 (setting forth objectives sanctions imposed on Haiti sought
to achieve).
541. Id.
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military intervention, done early on in the crisis, at the request
of Aristide, would have been a quicker, cheaper, and less de-
structive option than sanctions.
B. Sanctions' Long Term Effect and Article 55 of the U.N. Charter
Sanctions are only temporary tools542 and in theory should
only have short term effects. Yet few economies and societies are
resilient enough to bounce back from a near total embargo such
as the one imposed on Haiti. Sanctions will necessarily have neg-
ative short term effects, such as an increase in food prices.543
Senders of sanctions need to avoid the long term effects in order
to prevent the deterioration of the target's economy and eventu-
ally of the target's society. In order to do this, one needs a better
understanding of the environment targeted by sanctions. For
this, Article 55 provides useful guidelines.
Although Article 55 was not intended to apply to a sanctions
episode, 5 " it is worthwhile considering. The Article is couched
in fairly general terms yet it has set the direction the United Na-
tions has taken in terms of development and human rights.5 45
Article 55 delineates elementary standards and the United Na-
tions should take them into consideration before applying sanc-
tions. Assuming that the target is a developing country trying to
achieve the objectives set out in Article 55, the United Nations
would be less likely to impose a haphazard embargo, by using
Article 55 as a guideline. The organization would have to first
assess the socio-economic status of the target and determine
what type of sanctions would cause the least damage to the tar-
get's development. The Specialized Agencies could do for Arti-
cle 55 what the U.N. Secretary-General foresaw the Bretton
Woods institutions546 would do for Article 50, notably form a
mechanism to assess impact of sanctions prior to their imple-
mentation, to monitor application of the sanctions, minimize
542. See supra note 346 (quoting Security Council members' discussion on sanc-
tions being short term tools).
543. See supra note 393 and accompanying text (reporting on increase in food
prices during embargo).
544. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (setting forth the purposes of Article
55).
545. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, supra note 22.
546. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (outlining role of Bretton
Woods institutions).
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sanctions' collateral damage, and ensure delivery of humanita-
rian assistance.547 The Specialized Agencies are in a better posi-
tion to carry out the task since they have personnel directly in-
volved in the target country.548 By virtue of their work with
NGOs, experts, and local ministries, the Specialized Agencies are
the best available means to assess the potential impact of sanc-
tions.
Whereas the Secretary-General considered one mechanism
to monitor both targeted and sender states,549 it would be better
to have two separate entities to fulfill the two distinct roles. To
monitor the conditions in the targeted state, ECOSOC would be
the best venue. Without amending the U.N. Charter, ECOSOC
could establish the mechanism to monitor the targeted state by
creating a sub-commission pursuant to Article 68 of the U.N.
Charter.550 ECOSOC is in an excellent position to play this coor-
dinating and monitoring role because, pursuant to Article 71 of
the Charter, 51 it can make arrangements with NGOs, regional
and other international organizations, and the Specialized Agen-
cies. 52 In Haiti's case the agencies and organizations working in
Haiti had the best information,555 the most constructive com-
ments, 55 4 and the most relevant input, thereby proving their use-
fulness in helping to monitor the impact of sanctions on the tar-
get's population. If the ECOSOC option is to be a viable option,
however, there needs to be an uninterrupted two-way line of
communication between the suggested mechanism and the Se-
curity Council, which is partially provided for under Article 65 of,.
the Charter,555 to facilitate the transmittal of information and
547. See SUPPLEMENT TO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, supra note 11, 75 (proposing that
Bretton Woods institutions could provide monitoring capacity for Article 50 relief).
548. See supra note 72 (setting forth Specialized Agencies functionning in Haiti
during embargo).
549. See supra note 547 and accompanying text (setting forth alternative proposed
by Secretary General).
550. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing Article 68 and role of
ECOSOC).
551. See id. (outlining Article 71 of Charter).
552. See supra note 72 (positing that UNDP is in unique position to respond to
changing domestic situations).
553. See supra note 369, and notes 387-89 (illustrating importance of information
collected by U.N. agencies and NGOs working in Haiti).
554. See, e.g., supra note 389 (testifying as to impact of sanctions on food distribu-
tion programs).
555. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (citing Article 65 of U.N. Charter).
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the results of the monitoring.
Finally, while humanitarian crises test the DHA,556 the DIA
has yet to produce a viable consensus among the Specialized
Agencies and the NGOs to facilitate humanitarian assistance
during an embargo. Logically, sanctions should not necessitate
the level of humanitarian assistance as do other forms of inter-
vention such peace-enforcement, for example. Sanctions, how-
ever, as Haiti illustrated, 57 might eventually necessitate some
form of humanitarian assistance. The DHA, therefore, should
have the capacity to respond to humanitarian crises during a
sanctions episode. A separate entity that focuses solely on sanc-
tions' impact under the auspices of the DHA, would both
strengthen the use of sanctions as a policy tool by the United
Nations, and prevent the dilution of humanitarian assistance.
C. The Proper Use of Sanctions by the United Nations
The United Nations was created to fulfill two roles, notably,
to provide a peaceful and secure environment in the present
and to create the institutions, relations, and environments for
sustainable peace and security in the future.558 Sanctions, if
drawn out, can unfortunately exacerbate the dichotomy between
the two roles. Proper assessment and monitoring mechanisms
prior to and during the sanctions' implementation, would miti-
gate the potential contradiction between the United Nations'
two roles, as would a well-planned out exemption policy. Fur-
thiermore, increasing the cost of sanctions for sender states
would force those states not to apply sanctions lightly. Finally,
the United Nations needs to modify its modus operandi when tak-
ing Chapter VII action.
There are a number of procedural issues the newly created
monitoring mechanism could focus on to make sanctions an ef-
fective tool and a viable alternative to the use of force. One is to
target the sanctions properly by getting a good grasp of the so-
cial, economic, political and eventually historical factors at work
in the target country.559 A second approach could consist of
556. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (setting forth purposes of Depart-
ment of Humanitarian Affairs).
557. See supra notes 354-55 and accompanying text (discussing need for increased
humanitarian assistance in Haiti during sanctions).
558. See supra notes 38-40 (setting forth objectives of United Nations).
559. See supra notes 347-467 and accompanying text (positing that United Nations
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monthly assessment reports on traditionally vulnerable groups
such as women and children.
A clear and concise exemption policy is necessary to assure
the provision of basic goods and assistance to the target's popu-
lation during a sanctions episode. For instance, a process to re-
view exemptions managed by personnel who are qualified to re-
view humanitarian assistance requests, blanket waivers, or the ar-
rangement of charter flights and/or boats to bring supplies in
on a regular basis, would expedite humanitarian assistance. The
exemption policy should also facilitate the process for NGOs so
that they can apply directly to the United Nations and not
through their governments. Finally, the exemption policy
should also include better coordination in New York between
the DHA, the Specialized Agencies, the Security Council and the
newly created monitoring mechanism. A well-planned out ex-
emption policy and process would help improve the use of sanc-
tions, by allowing food and other supplies to get to the target
state in an expeditious manner, despite the embargo.
Generally, sender states should not apply sanctions lightly
and indiscriminately. If the cost of sanctions on the sender
countries were raised, it would lessen sanctions' appeal to the
sender countries. The senders' stakes could be raised by forcing
them to create an effective monitoring mechanism to monitor
the impact of the sanctions on the target state's population or by
forcing the sender states to pay a share of the humanitarian
assistance. Their amount of humanitarian assistance would be-
proportionate to the loss their sanctions inflicted on the target
country.
The United Nations retains a Cold War mentality in the
sense that the organization still tends to view the relationship
between the diplomats, the lawyers, the strategists, operations,
and the tactical levels as sequential rather than interrelated. 6 0
imposed sanctions on Haiti without first thoroughly analyzing Haiti's socio-economic
and political climate).
560. See General Gordon Sullivan, Ethnic Conflicts: Challenges for the US. Army, in
ETHNIC CONFLICT AND REGIONAL INSTABILITY. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. Poucv AND ARMY
ROLES AND MISSIONS, 3, 8 (Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Richard H. Shultz, eds., 1994) (pos-
iting that
[a] simplistic view of decisions to use force defines the relationship between
the political and the military as sequential. First, we determine our political
objective, and then the military commander applies force to achieve it. This
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One of the primary changes in international relations since the
end of the Cold War is that these four levels are much more
closely linked.5 61 The United Nations has yet to apply this new
mentality and remains inflexible particularly in the implementa-
tion of its Chapter VII actions.5 62 The hierarchy among the vari-
ous actors is still too formal and political and tends to omit key
players such as the NGOs. Had the United Nations been more
flexible in its policy toward Haiti, allowing for more participa-
tion in the policy-making process by the Specialized Agencies
and the NGOs, the sanctions policy might have been more effec-
tive and less drastic than it turned out to be.
CONCLUSION
Sanctions did not solve Haiti's crisis but they might work
elsewhere if properly implemented. The Haitian sanctions epi-
sode taught a number of invaluable lessons for the future use of
sanctions. For an effective sanctions episode the United Nations
cannot ignore the political and socio-economic climate of the
targeted country. In Haiti's case, the United Nations observed
the legal formalities for implementing sanctions pursuant to the
framework set out in the Charter. Yet the organization virtually
ignored Haiti's socio-economic history despite the obvious pov-
erty of the country. Sanctions are effective as short term, superfi-
cial, and targeted instruments. They are not effective in resolv-
ing systemic ills which remain Haiti's main problem. In addi-
tion, in Haiti's case, the overarching sanctions policy gradually
widened to include a variety of objectives. The initial goal was to
send the military to the negotiating table. Eventually the sanc-
tions became not only a behavior modifying instrument but also
a punishment. Because they were comprehensive, the sanctions
against Haiti deliberately or mistakenly affected all aspects of
Haitian society, politics, and economy. In the event that sanc-
tions become a long-term fixture in a given U.N. policy, it is vital
that the United Nations respect the legal framework and ensure
that there is a monitoring mechanism to assess the targeted
model has served us well; but perhaps it is a model that does not capture the
necessary reality of this type of conflict [intra-state conflict].)
561. Id.
562. See supra notes 305-13 and accompanying text (detailing how United Nations
used Security Council and Sanctions Committee rather than other institutions to moni-
tor implementation and effect of sanctions).
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state's environment. The United Nations should use Article 55
of the Charter as a barometer to measure the amount of pres-
sure it needs to apply in a sanctions episode. Article 55 requires
the United Nations to create a sustainable development policy
and the sanctions applied under Article 41 of the Charter should
not undermine that duty. Moreover, without amending the
U.N. Charter, the United Nations can establish an effective mon-
itoring mechanism with the help of ECOSOC, the Specialized
Agencies, and NGOs. The United Nations should uphold Haiti
as a standard of how and when not to apply sanctions so that, at
the very least, Haiti's population did not suffer in vain during
the embargo.
